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"The Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy Is Now in the States."
- Washington Post

"Regulatefirst, think later ... renewable energy ... electricity prices
and ... rollingblackouts."
- Wall Street Journal
I. ONE CAN'T GET THERE FROM HERE

On March 25, 2013, The Washington Post ran a story entitled The
Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy Is Now in the States, which
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1. Brad Plumer, The Biggest Fight over Renewable Energy Is Now in the
States, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/

wonkblog/wp/2013/03/25/the-biggest-fights-over-renewable-energy-are-nowhappening-in-the-states.
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describes how a large portion of the "action on clean energy in the
United States is happening at the state level." 2 This is the critical, if
often overlooked, structural element of the U.S. sustainable energy
future. States are at the core of U.S. renewable/sustainable energy
policy; the federal government has not enacted a significant new
renewable energy law in more than a decade, other than tax
incentives. 3 Many states have advanced five different types of
renewable energy mechanisms, which provide incentives for
renewable energy.4 The Washington Post is correct that (1) the center
of gravity for renewable energy policy is now in the states, rather
than the federal government, and (2) there is a very big fight. That
fight is not only over the policy described by the Post,but has critical
constitutional dimensions regarding state and federal roles under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
On March 29, 2013, The Wall Street Journal published an article
criticizing states for treating renewable power produced outside their
states unequally to that sold inside the state. Such treatment, in
which numerous states are engaging, raises core constitutional
questions under the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
The Journal article put in cryptic terms this state geographic
discrimination which disallows the interstate market in renewable
energy from functioning smoothly, noting, "[a]bout three-quarters
must come from [in-state sources] even though other states can
produce renewables at lower cost. . . . The Journal article focused
on the policy aspects of what, in reality, is a major constitutional
issue that is now in the courts regarding state sustainable energy
issues.
States are responsible for the primary legislative and regulatory
initiatives designed to promote sustainable energy and renewable
energy in the United States. The federal government has not passed
significant domestic energy legislation since the Energy Policy Act

2. Id.
3. See infra Part III.B.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. California Coming Green-Outs: The Wind and Solar Mandate Means
Future Power Shortages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/

articles/SB10001424127887324582804578344500414630778.
6. Id.
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of 2005 -which was relatively modest in scope. The states have
undertaken most renewable energy policy initiatives in the past two
decades, sculpting sustainable energy policy around five legal and
policy initiatives:
* Net Metering: in eighty-five percent of states
* Renewable portfolio standards: in sixty percent of states
* Renewable System Benefit Charges: in thirty-three
percent of states
* Carbon and greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation: in twenty
percent of the states
* Feed-In Tariffs: in less than ten percent of states
Each of these can be a powerful stimulant to sustainable renewable
energy deployment in a market economy; each provides a financial
inflow at either the point of project construction or generation of
7. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 included an estimated $9 billion over five years in tax
incentives distributed among renewable energy, conservation, and traditional
energy sources, including several alternative technology vehicle credits, enactment
of three investment credits for clean coal, and the extension of the production tax
credit. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41769, ENERGY TAX POLICY: ISSUES IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 26 (2011).
There also was the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, but it primarily
provided incentives for greater efficiency, "increased the target fuel efficiency for
combined fleets of cars and light trucks, increased renewable fuel standards, and
increased a number of energy-efficiency standards for household and commercial
appliance equipment." MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43206,
ENERGY TAX POLICY: ISSUES IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 28 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43206.pdf. Additionally, the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended the production tax credit (PTC) "through
2012 for wind and 2013 for other eligible technologies, the energy credit (ITC) was
expanded for small wind property, and taxpayers were given the option of
receiving a direct grant from the Treasury in lieu of tax credits under the Section
1603 grant program." Id. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 changed the
expiration date for the PTC from when equipment was placed-in-service to a start
date of construction for all qualifying technologies, and extended the PTC for wind
for one year, which was estimated to cost $12.2 billion over the ten-year window.
Id. at 3 1.
8. See infra Part IV.
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renewable electric power. 9 The state acts as a regulator, and never
owns the renewable power generation capital equipment nor itself
transacts any sale of the power produced. And it is this action as a
regulator, rather than a market participant, which raises constitutional
issues with discriminatory state renewable energy initiatives.10
Each of these state measures torques the operation of the electric
energy market through regulation, in contrast to the federal tax policy
of collecting general taxes and reallocating benefits through tax
incentives to specific projects.11 Tax policy does not raise the same
legal issues as state regulation of economic markets. This article
marshals the facts: first, federal tax policy now predominately
supports renewable energy as opposed to fossil fuels.12 Second, the
shift to predominate tax support of renewable energy occurred at the
end of the prior administration.13
As the Post article notes, there is now a significant fight. Some
citizen groups, governors, and other elected officials have begun to
highlight cross-subsidies occurring through these state practices from
electric consumers to entities designated by state regulation as
recipients:14 the President of NRG Energy noted that lower cost solar
and wind power is forcing utilities to spread their increasing fixed
costs over fewer customers, increasing the cost of service to
remaining customers. And consumers are often confronted with no
choice. In more than two-thirds of the states, there is no alternative
for retail power consumers other than to purchase all of their electric
power from the monopoly utility and incur any invisible additional
costs associated with state incentive mechanisms bulleted above. 16
There has also been litigation centered around this topic:17
9. See infra Part IV.F.

10. See

STEVEN
FERREY,
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW:
EXPLANATIONS 162-64 (6th ed. 2006) (examining the

EXAMPLES

AND

market participant

exception).
11. See infra Part IV.F.1.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part IV.F.2.
15. Andrew Engblom, NRG CEO: Distributed Generation a 'Mortal Threat to
Utilities', SNL ENERGY (Mar. 22, 2013, 10:21 AM), http://www.snl.com/
InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A- 17263021-14130.
16. See generally State-By-State, RETAIL ENERGY SUPPLY Ass'N,
http://www.resausa.org/states (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (thirty-six states still
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* The first of these five state initiatives, Feed-in tariffs
(FiTs), which exceed the "avoided cost" (which all FiTs
do), has been struck as illegal.I
* The second of these five initiatives, renewable portfolio
standards, is unconstitutional in the method that some
states have implemented it, and in 2013, it was declared
unconstitutional by the federal Court of Appeals in the
Seventh Circuit. 19
* The third of these five initiatives, system benefit charges,
as implemented in some states, is at least de jure
questionable on its face.20
* A recent federal adjudicatory order casts uncertainty on
the fourth of these five initiatives, net metering. 2 1
* The fifth of these five state initiatives, carbon regulation,
has at least one state withdrawing participation due to a
perceived lack of benefit given the cost to power
consumers,22 and California's program has lost several,
and to date prevailed on appeal on some, constitutional
lawsuits against it which have proceeded to a decision on
the merits. 23

maintain monopolies on the sale of electric power). See also The History of Retail
Energy Competition, RETAIL ENERGY SUPPLY Ass'N, http://www.resausa.org/
retail-energy/retail-energy-history (last visited Jan. 25, 2014), for a history of
energy monopolies in the United States.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. FERC, as an administrative executive branch agency, does not determine
unconstitutionality as courts do, however, it administers the same federal laws and
Constitutional requirement of the Constitutional exercise of federal versus state
power. A court would have adjudicated similar facts as an unconstitutional exercise
of state power; FERC, as an executive agency, hold FiTs illegal. See Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 61,047 (2010) (Order on Petitions for Declaratory
Order).
19. Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 721 F.3d 764
(7th Cir. 2013).
20. See infra notes 336-38.
21. See MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC 61,340 (2001).
22. See infra Part IV.F.2.
23. See infra notes 217-20.
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Both The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal have

highlighted key renewable energy policy issues. From a legal
perspective, the constitutional and legal issues confronting state
sustainable energy policy are fundamentally at the core of our
federalist legal system. After examining federal incentives for
sustainable energy policy, this article delves in detail into the legal
nuances of the methods by which states have implemented these five
primary state initiatives for sustainable energy policy. Of note as we
proceed, each state could implement most of these five initiatives in
manners and modes that are more resilient against constitutional or
legal challenges, but the majority of states have not seized such
opportunities.24
Part II of this article examines the critical role of electric power
and the environmental impact of its use both domestically and
internationally in a newly carbon-constrained world. Part III sets the
federal backdrop by surveying and quantifying federal tax and grant
initiatives for renewable energy, and documenting the significant
shift from support of fossil fuels to support of renewable energy. Part
IV outlines each of the five major state initiatives, and surveys their
variations as implemented by the states, as well as their potential
legal Achilles' heels under the Constitution. Part V lays the legal
foundation, examining the contours of the Supremacy Clause and the
Dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court on these matters. Part VI applies
these constitutional requirements to the five primary state sustainable
energy initiatives, highlighting recent challenges, court decisions, and
the potential vulnerability of state programs. Part VII synthesizes
these elements into a prescription of what states can do to navigate
around constitutional challenge and sustain state policy.
So while this article charts a detailed roadmap of sustainable
energy initiatives, landmarks, detours, and legal prohibitions, it also
develops the critical counterpoint that the states can avoid legal
challenges to their particular sustainable energy policies. Indeed,
there is a way to get to a sustainable future from where we are now
without tripping over constitutional prohibitions.
24. See infra Part VI; Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multi-Million Dollar
ConstitutionalPuzzle Surrounding State 'Sustainable' Energy Policy (forthcoming

2014).
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II. AT THE Zoo: FEEDING AND TRAINING THE CARBON ELEPHANT
Amid the current policy stalemates between the federal executive
and legislative branches, the U.S. electric industry is one of the
biggest industries in the world with $363 billion of sales in 2012.25
The industry is large and its impact is even larger. Electricity
production accounts for less than five percent of U.S. economic
activity, yet accounts for approximately one-quarter of emissions of
certain criteria air pollutants.26
Power derived from burning fossil fuels producing electric power
releases large amounts of CO 2 into the environment;27 ninety-eight
percent of anthropogenic CO 2 emissions are from combustion of
fossil fuels. 2 8 Fossil fuel-fired power plants and petroleum refineries
collectively emit nearly forty percent of our national GHG
emissions-significantly more than the thirty percent emanating from
the transportation sector. 29 Fossil fuel generation accounts for sixtyfour percent of total human-made atmospheric CO 2 and has increased
significantly since 1990.30 GHG annual emissions increased about
25. For U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration data,
see Table 2.3. Revenue from Retail Sales ofElectricity to Ultimate Customers, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/

epa 02_03.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
26. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2004, power
generation was responsible for sixty-seven percent of the oxides of sulphur (SOx),
twenty-two percent of the oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and thirty-four percent of the
carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) emissions in the United States. See also Climate Change:
GHG Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
emissions/co2 human.html.
27. The amount of carbon released per unit of usable energy decreased as
human populations moved from wood to coal as the dominant C0 2-releasing fuel in
the late nineteenth century, and again when humans moved from coal to oil in the
mid-twentieth century. Humans now will move toward natural gas in the future.
See STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 2.1 (30th ed. 2013).
28. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, EMISSION OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, ES1 (U.S. Dep't of Energy et al.

1999).
29. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ADDRESSING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/ghgsettlement.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2011) (discussing EPA activity pertaining to regulation of GHGs under NSPS
program).
30. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT No. DOE/EIA0573(2005/ES), EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2005:
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seventy percent from 1970 to 2004, with the combustion of fossil
fuels accounting for seventy percent of GHG emissions, electric
power generation responsible for forty-percent of these CO 2
emissions, and coal-fired electric power generation accounting for
about seventy percent of the emissions in this sector.31
Not only is this a very large "elephant" in the policy "room," but
its presence is growing larger as world electric power demand
continues to increase dramatically.3 2 The share of fossil fuels
converted to create electricity increased over the last century from
one percent in 1900 to twenty-five percent in 1990.33 In 1949, only
eleven percent of CO 2 emissions in the United States came from the
electricity sector; in 2007 it was more than one-third.3 4 Global CO 2
emissions are rising each year, 35 and global energy-related emissions
are expected to increase fifty-seven percent from 2005 to 2030.36 At

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

2-3

summary/pdf/0573(2005)es.pdf;
CARBON

DIOXIDE

INFO.

(2007),

http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/

Frequently Asked Global Change Questions,

ANALYSIS

CTR.,

http://cdiac.ornl.gov/faq.html

(last

updated Dec. 11, 2013).
31. Jolle de Sepibus, The Liberalisationof the PowerIndustry in the European
Union and its Impact on Climate Change: A Legal Analysis of the InternalMarket

in Electricity 2-4 (Swiss Nat'l Ctr. of Competence in Res., Working Paper No.
2008/10,
2008),
http://phasel.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/Brown%/o20Bags/
de20SepibusEU20lib2OCC-final.pdf.
32. See, e.g., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004, at 29
(2004),
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/
WE02004.pdf.
33. Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 261, 267
(2005).
34. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY-RELATED
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL SECTORS,
BY FUEL TYPE, 1949-2007 (2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/excel/

historical co2.xls.
35. See Ray Purdy, The Legal Implications of Carbon Capture and Storage
under the Sea, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Fall 2006, at 22, 23.
36. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-151, INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL'S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT

MECHANISM 48 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/283397.pdf.
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current rates of energy development, energy-related CO 2 emissions in
2050 will be 250% of their current levels.3 7
Because federal energy policy has been unclear for the last two
decades, critical time has elapsed. Global emissions will need to have
peaked by 2015 in order to have a reasonable chance of limiting
global warming to no more than two degrees from historic levels.3 8
However, the opposite is occurring. Emissions grew at an average
annual rate of 3.10% from 2000 to 2011, and were fourteen percent
higher already in 2012 than the 2020 target. 3 9 Emissions rose by six
percent in 2010, the largest amount on record.4 0
Even the goal of an average 2020 eighteen percent reduction from
1990 levels by Annex I developed countries as required by the Kyoto
Protocol is not nearly enough to avoid a two degree Centigrade rise
in global temperature.41 A report concluded that reduction of carbon
intensity needs to achieve 600% more than it is achieving for the next
thirty-nine years to be able to hold temperature rise to two degrees
Centigrade. 42 Instead, the report predicts a six degree Centigrade rise
in global temperature by the end of the century.4 3

37. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2006: IN
SUPPORT OF THE G8 PLAN OF ACTION 25 (2006), http://www.iea.org/publications/

freepublications/publication/etp2006.pdf.
38. Robin Chase, Op-Ed., Get Real on Global Warming Goals, Bos. GLOBE,
Apr. 22, 2008, at Al5; see also James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric C0 2:
Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC. SCI. J. 217, 229 (2008)
(noting that by waiting until 2018 to prevent the "growth of greenhouse gas
emissions" may actually make it almost impossible to avoid the catastrophic effects
of warming).
39. Andrew Childers, U.N. Report Say Greenhouse Gas Emissions Were 14
Percent Higher than 2020 Target, 43 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 3036 (Nov. 30, 2012).
40. Greenhouse Gases Rise by Record Amount, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 3, 2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/nov/04/greenhouse-gases-riserecord-levels.
41. Summary of the DOHA Climate Change Conference: 26 November-8
December 2012, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Dec. 11, 2012, at 26, http://
www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb 12567e.pdf.
42. Leo Johnson, Foreword to PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, Too LATE FOR
Two DEGREES? Low CARBON ECONOMY INDEX 2012, at 1 (2012), http://
www.pwc.com/en GX/gx/sustainability/publications/low-carbon-economy-index/
assets/pwc-low-carbon-economy-index-2012.pdf.
43. Id.
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So how are we "feeding" this energy elephant? Most countries are
using fossil fuels, not renewable power resources, to satisfy this
exponential increase in demand for more power. Choice of today's
power generation technology translates directly to the size of
tomorrow's carbon footprint. It is expected that global energy use
will increase by about sixty percent between 2010 and 2040.44 The
International Energy Agency forecasts that by 2030, world demand
for energy will grow by almost sixty percent, and fossil fuel sources
will still supply eighty-two percent of the total while non-carbon
renewable energy sources are projected to supply less than fifteen
percent.45 However, just because the energy animal is large, this does
not mean that it cannot be trained. The Energy Information
Administration in 2008 concluded that the electric power sector
offered the most cost-effective opportunities to reduce CO 2
emissions, compared to the transportation sector.4 6 This is where
national and state policy must intersect. Both will be examined in the
next two parts.
III. STARTING AT THE Top: SHIFTING FEDERAL TAX INCENTIVES

To promote sustainable energy investments in an economy that is
market-driven, investment in energy is encouraged by federal tax
incentives. Before analyzing federal tax policy incentives for energy,
the next section briefly examines the composition of U.S. energy use.
A. Energy Use in the United States
The majority of energy produced in the United States is derived
from fossil fuels. "In 2010, fossil fuels accounted for [seventy-eight
percent] of U.S. primary energy production." 47 Table 1 shows the

44. 2013 InternationalEnergy Outlook: Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN,
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/world.cfm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
45. Id. fig.16.
46. Charles Davis, Energy Estimates Show Rise in CO 2 Emissions, Offer
Mitigation Options, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, June 30, 2008, at 20.
47. See generally MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41953,
ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES: MEASURING VALUE ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF
ENERGY RESOURCES, at Summary (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/

R41953.pdf.

2014] CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES IN MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS

261

breakdown of this statistic.48 "The remaining primary energy
production is attributable to nuclear electric and renewable energy
resources, with shares of 11.2% and 10.7%, respectively." Currently,
the electric system relies primarily on coal-fired resources: 406 U.S.
coal-fired power plants produce about ninety-five percent of the coalfired power in the United States, accounting for approximately half
of total U.S. electricity production, at an average cost of 3.2
cents/Kwh; approximately ten percent of these older plants produce
about forty-three percent of the CO 2 emissions. 49
Table 1: Primary Energy Production by Source50
2010
Source
Fossil Fuels

Quadrillion Btu

Percent of Total

Coal

22.1

29.4%

Natural Gas

22.1

29.4%

Crude Oil

11.7

15.6%

Natural Gas Plant

2.7

3.6%

8.4

11.2%

Hydro-Electric Power

2.5

3.3%

Geothermal

0.2

0.3%

Solar/PV

0.1

0.1%

Wind

0.9

1.2%

Biomass

4.3

5.7%

Total

75.0

100%

Liquids
Nuclear
Nuclear Electric

Renewable Energy

48. Id. at 4 tbl.1.

49. What Cost Energy? What Market Prices Fail to Reveal, 22
3, 3 (2009).
50. SHERLOCK, supra note 47, at 4 tbl.1.

ELECTRICITY J.
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These data are presented graphically in Figure 1.51 Biomass was
the largest source among renewable technologies in 2010, accounting
for 5.7% of overall primary energy production or more than half of

renewable energy production.52 Among renewable sources, hydroelectric power followed at 3.3%, and wind, geothermal, and solar
were responsible for 1.2 %, 0. 3 %, and 0.1% of 2009 primary energy

production, respectively. 53
Figure 1: 2010 Primary Energy Production by Source 54
NGPL
Crude Oil

3.6%

Nuclear Electric Power
11.2%

Hydro-Electric Power

Natural Gas
29.4%

Wirrd
1.2%

thrRenewables

&lrP

Coal
29.4%

B. Federal Tax Incentives

The primary federal energy incentives are delivered through tax
credits and depreciation. There is nothing atypical about this: world
governments subsidize gasoline, electricity and other energy in the
amount of $1.9 trillion a year. The predominate direction of U.S.
51. Id. at 4 fig.1.
52. Id. at 4.
53.

Id.

54. Id. at 4 fig.1.
55. Press Release No. 13/93, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Calls for Global
Reform of Energy Subsidies: Sees Major Gains for Economic Growth and the
Environment (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/
pr1393.htm; see also Howard Schneider, IMF: Governments Need to End Energy
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federal tax incentives has shifted recently from underwriting coal to
supporting renewable power. The value of federal tax support for the
energy sector was estimated to be $19.1 billion in 2010 and $16.6
billion in 2012.56 Of this, approximately one-third ($6.3 billion) was
given for tax incentives for the use of renewable fuels.5 7 "Another
$6.7 billion can be attributed to tax-related incentives supporting
various renewable energy technologies,"5 8 and targeted tax incentives
for the use of fossil energy resources amounted to $2.4 billion. 59 "In
2010, nearly half of the tax incentives for renewables benefitted
biofuels,"6 0 and "from 2009 onwards, the increased costs associated
with incentives for renewable electricity are largely attributable to the
Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credit program." 61
Subsidies, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201303-27/business/38059145 1 climate-change-energy-subsidies-imf-officials.
56. SHERLOCK, supra note 47, at 6.

57. Id. at 6-7 tbl.2.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 10 ("Of the estimated $19.1 billion in energy tax provisions in 2010,
an estimated $6.3 billion, or [thirty-three percent], went toward supporting
biofuels.").
6 1. Id.
The Section 1603 grant option is not available for projects that began
construction after December 31, 2011. However, since grants are paid out
when construction is completed and eligible property is placed in service,
outlays under the Section 1603 program are expected to continue through
2017.... Outlays under the Section 1603 grant program are projected to
[be $4.1 billion for FY2012] ...

. Under current law, wind property must

be placed in service prior to the end of calendar year 2012 to qualify for
the Section 1603 grant. To qualify for the grant, eligible biomass,
geothermal energy, landfill gas, trash, hydropower, and marine and
hydrokinetic property must be placed in service by the end of 2013. By
FY2015, outlays under the Section 1603 grant program are projected to
fall to $1.2 billion. The placed-in-service deadline for solar, geothermal
heat pump, fuel cell, microturbine, and combined heat and power (CHP)
property is the end of 2016. For FY2017, projected outlays are $0.1
billion.
Id. For additional background, see PHILLIP BROWN & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41635, ARRA SECTION 1603 GRANTS IN LIEU OF TAX CREDITS
FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY: OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS (2011),

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41635_20110208.pdf.
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As of August 2011, renewable developers had received $28.5
billion in grants and loan guarantees from the Obama
Administration. 62 About a quarter of this amount flowed through the
63
U.S. Treasury Section 1603 grant program. The remainder is
commitments through the Section 1705 loan guarantee program for
thirty-two different projects.6 4 As of May 2013, the 1603 program
had approved 9000 grants for $18.5 billion, $17 billion of which
were received for wind projects. 65 Figure 2 displays the cost of tax
incentives for various fossil fuel and renewable technologies over an
almost forty-year period ending in fiscal year 2015. A recent shift to
incentives for renewable power is visible, first occurring during the
Bush Administration in 2008.
Figure 2: Projected Annual Cost of Energy-Related Tax Incentives 66
Fiscal Year 1977-Fiscal Year 2015

62. Jeffrey Ryser, Cash, Loan Guarantee Programs for Renewable
Development Now Total up to $28.5 Billion, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Aug. 8, 2011, at

3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Lydia Beyoud, Report: Some Renewable Energy Groups May Have DoubleDipped on Energy Credits, ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (BNA) (Feb. 27, 2014).
66. SHERLOCK, supra note 47, at 11 fig.2.
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Table 2 of the Congressional Research Service Report below
displays the estimated revenue cost of various federal energy tax
incentives for recent years.6 7 Renewable energy has dominated fossil
fuels for the past five years. Table 3 summarizes and contrasts energy
production and energy tax incentives. 68 The analysis presented in
these tables highlights only energy subsidies provided through the tax
code, and does not examine direct or indirect energy subsidies.6 9
Although 44.9% of generation in 2010 can be attributed to coal, coal

received an estimated ten percent of tax incentives. 70 Again,
renewable energy dominates fossil fuels for the recent years of data
presented.
Table 2: Estimated Revenue7 1
Fiscal Year 2010-Fiscal Year 2012
Cost of Energy Tax Provisions in $ Billions
Provision

2010

2011

2012

Expensing of Exploration and
Development Costs for Oil and Gas
Percentage Depletion for Oil and Gas

0.7

0.8

0.8

0.5

0.9

0.9

Amortization of Geological and
Geophysical Costs for Oil and Gas
Exploration
Fifteen-Year Depreciation for Natural Gas
Distribution Lines

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Fossil Fuels

67. Id. at 6-7 tbl.2 (displaying the Joint Committee on Taxation and the
Department of the Treasury data).
68. Id. at 8-9 tbl.3 (calculated using data presented above, supra Tables 1 & 2).
69. Id. at 14. In contrast to U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) studies, this
includes Section 1603 grants in the place of tax credits as a tax-related provision.
The EIA lists the Section 1603 grants in place "of tax credits as a direct
expenditure." Id.
70. Id. at 14. This is similar to the EIA's data for 2007, "where 47.6% of
generation was attributable to coal, while coal received 12.7% of the total federal
financial support for electricity production." See also id. at 8 tbl.3.
71. Id. at 6-7 tbl.2.
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2010

2011

2012

0.7

0.8

0.7

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

N/A72

0.2

0.2

2.4

3.3

3.2

Production Tax Credit (PTC)

1.4

1.4

1.6

Investment Tax Credit (ITC)

(i)73

0.5

0.5

Accelerated Depreciation for Renewable

0.3

0.3

0.3

Election to Expense fifty percent of
Qualified Refinery Costs
Amortization of Air Pollution Control
Facilities
Credits for Investments in Clean Coal
Facilities
Excise Tax Credits for Alternative Fuel
Mixtures
Subtotal, FossilFuels

Renewables

Energy Property

Table 3: Comparing Energy Production and Energy Tax Incentives
Fossil Fuels and Renewables, 201074
Production

Tax Incentives

Quadrillion
Btu

Dollar
% of
Total

Billions
of
Dollars

Dollar
% of
Total

Fossil Fuels

58.5

78.0%

$2.4

12.6%

Renewablesa

8.1

10.7%

$13.0

68.1%

Renewables

5.6

7.4%

$13.0

68.1%

(excluding hydro72. N/A "indicates that the provision was not listed in the 2010 tax expenditure
tables." Id. at 8.
73. "(i) indicates a positive estimated revenue loss of less than $50 million." Id.
74. Id. at 8-9 tbl.3.
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electric)
Renewables

6.2

8.3%

$6.7

35.1%

3.7

4.9%

$6.7

35.1%

(excluding biofuels
and related tax
incentives)
Renewables

(excluding
hydro-electric and
biofuels and related
tax incentives)

Table 4 presents subsidies to electricity production by fuel type.
Again, as of this date, fossil fuels receive a much smaller percentage
allocation than their share of electric production. Correspondingly,
renewable sources receive a much larger share than their share of
electric production.
Table 4: Subsidies to Electricity Production by Fuel Type, 2010
(Dollar values in millions)
Production
Fuel Type

Federal Financial Incentives

FY2010
Net
Generation
(billion
kWh)

% of
Total

Tax
Subsidies

Other
Subsidies

% of
Total

Coal

1,851

44.9%

486

703

10.0%

Natural Gas

1,030

25.0%

583

72

5.5%

Nuclear

807

19.6%

908

1,591

21.0%

Renewables

425

10.3%

1,347

5,212

55.3%

Biomass

57

1.4%1

54

61

1.0%

and
Petroleum
Liquids

75. Id. at 15 tbl.4. The data is taken from the EIA. Id.
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Geothermal

16

0.4%

1

199

1.7%

Hydropower

257

6.2%

17

198

1.8%

Solar

1

0.0%

99

869

8.2%

Wind

95

2.3%

1,178

3,808

42.0%

Transmission

(i)

(i)

58

924

8.2%

and
Distribution
Total

4,091

100%

3,382

8,502

100%

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S
Department of Energy assembles its energy subsidy data in the tables
below in a different manner than the tables above. EIA includes the
Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits in its direct expenditures
category. Tables 2-4 and the analysis above include Section 1603
grants as tax-related federal financial support. "In 2010, $4.25 billion
in Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits were awarded to
renewable energy projects" while the shares of electricity produced
using natural gas, petroleum, and nuclear resources, "and the share of
federal financial support for electricity received by these resources,
also remained similar between 2007 and 2010."76 Tables 5 and 6
distinguish the federal subsidies attributed to electric production and
to non-electric energy production, respectively.
Table 5: Subsidies to Electricity Production by Fuel Type, 2007 7
(Dollar values in millions)
Production
Fuel Type

Federal Financial Incentives

FY2007
% of
Net
Total
Generation
(billion

Tax
Subsidies

Other
Subsidies

% of
Total

264

590

12.7%

kWh)

Coal

76. Id. at 15.

77. Id. at 16 tbl.5.

1,946

47.6%
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Refined Coal

72

1.8%

2,156

32.0%

Natural Gas and

919

22.5%

203

24

3.4%

Nuclear

794

19.4%

199

1,068

18.8%

Renewables

360

8.8%

724

284

14.9%

Petroleum
Liquids

Total Subsidy Value
Biomass

40

1.0%

36

0.5%

Geothermal

15

0.4%

14

0.2%

Hydropower

258

6.3%

174

2.6%

Solar

1

0.0%

14

0.2%

Wind

31

0.8%

724

10.7%

Landfill Gas

6

0.1%

8

0.1%

Municipal Solid

9

0.2%

1

0.0%

Waste
Transmission

(i)

735

500

18.3%

4,281

2,466

100%

and Distribution
Total

4,091

100%

Table 6: Energy Subsidies Not Related to Electricity Production,
201078
(Dollar values in millions)
Production
Fuel Type

Fuel
Production
Not Used
For

% of
Total

Federal Financial
Incentives
Total
% Total
Subsidies

Electricity

78. Id. at 17-18 tbl.6. This data is from the Congressional Research Services
and the EIA. Id.
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(quadrillion
Btu)
Coal

2.94

8.3%

169

1.6%

Natural Gas

28.55

80.3%

2,165

20.7%

3.87

10.9%

7,646

73.2%

Geothermal

0.06

0.2%

73

0.7%

Solar

0.10

0.3%

169

1.6%

Other

0.02

0.0%

226

2.2%

Renewables
Total

35.54

100%

10,448

100%

and Petroleum
Liquids
Biomass/

Biofuels

Significant federal tax credits continue. The value of federal
production tax credits is compared, apples-to-apples basis, in Table
7.79 Despite the importance of the production tax credit, renewable
power has additionally provided other significant incentives in
certain states. so

79. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT No. JCX-23-10, PRESENT LAW
ENERGY-RELATED TAX PROVISIONS AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET 118 tbl.8 (2010), available at https://

www.jct.gov/publications.html?func-startdown&id=3678.
80. See infra Part IV. According to the Department of Energy Funded Database
of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), twenty-six states offer
some type of solar energy tax incentive with over fifty-one different types of
programs. Overall there are 228 different types of rebates available in the states for
renewable energy. See RUSTY HAYNES, N.C. SOLAR CTR., STATE SOLAR POLICY:
CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK, Apr. 15, 2008, http://api.ning.com/files/
1YF4B3g6mfrZrlo7LywgFlukJTsLq*VEi4OQOfOkdqMCPFDaaGD5sumpGbsnn8mdcmF
DwG5b7dorgN*TXTdJzMdSGIEK6f*/DSIREHaynesStateSolarPolicyCurrentStat
usAndFutureOutlookMarch2008.pdf.
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Table 7: Comparison of Selected Federal Energy Production Tax
Credits81
Statutory
Credit
Amount

Wind power

2.2 cents
per

Credit
Amount in
Dollars per
MMBtus of

Credit Amount
in Dollars per
MMBtus of
Displaced Heat

$6.45

$2.23

$6.45

$2.23

$3.23

$1.12

$5.28

$1.82

kilowatt2.2 cents

Geothermal
power

per
kilowatthour
1.1 cents

Open-loop
biomass

Advanced
nuclear power

Ethanol

per
kilowatthour
1.8 cents
per
kilowatthour
45$5.92

$5.92

per gallon

$1 per
Biodiesel

gallon
(expired
12/31/09)

$8.45

$8.45

In the past seven years, there have been substantial U.S. federal tax
incentives for renewable energy development. The fossil fuels related
tax incentives are estimated by the Congressional Research Service
to reduce federal tax revenues by $20.6 billion between 2013 and
81. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 79.
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2017; during the same period "the total cost of tax-related provisions
supporting the production of renewable energy (tax expenditures and
grants designed to replace tax expenditures) is estimated to be $39.6
billion."82
Notwithstanding these tax credits and incentives, the United States
has been criticized as ranking near the bottom of the thirty-four
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
countries (along with Canada, Mexico, and Chile) in terms of
effective national energy tax rates to limit national carbon dioxide
emissions.83 The United States was criticized for not taxing energy
use for heating, process use, and electricity, although some U.S.
states do tax some of these uses.84 However, the states have put forth
significant effort to promote renewable energy and limit carbon
emissions.
IV.

STATE REGULATORY INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE POWER

With the federal government principally engaged in tax incentives
for U.S. sustainable power development, additional regulatory
initiatives are undertaken by a significant percentage of states. As
mentioned above, many states across the country have undertaken
five renewable energy legal policy initiatives over the past two
decades.8 5 The following part will explore these initiatives in more
detail.
82. SHERLOCK & CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 7, at 14-15. "Of this total for
renewable energy, $17.2 billion is for outlays under the Section 1603 grants in lieu
of tax credits program." The cost of tax expenditure and excise tax incentives for
renewables, not counting the Section 1603 grants, is estimated to be $22.4 billion
from 2013 and 2017. Id. "Historically, the primary tax incentive for renewable
electricity has been the production tax credit (PTC). The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act .. . substantially modified this incentive, allowing projects
eligible for the renewable PTC or investment tax credit (ITC) to claim a one-time
grant in lieu of the tax credits." Id.
83. OECD, TAXING ENERGY USE: A GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 31 (2013), available
at
http://www.keepeek.com/oecd/media/taxation/taxing-energy-use
9789264183933-en#pagel; Rick Mitchell, U.S. Lags on Using Energy Taxes to
Achieve Environmental Goals, OECD Data Shows, 36 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA)

228, 228-29 (2013).
84. Mitchell, supra note 83.
85. See supra PartI.
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Renewable Portfolio Standards

Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) require electric utilities and
other retail electric providers to include in their retail sales a
specified percentage of electricity supply annually from renewable
energy sources. 86 Such standards create and account for Renewable
Energy Credits (RECs) associated with production of each megawatthour of generation from an eligible renewable energy facility. RECs
can be associated with utility-owned generation, or regulated utilities,
and retailers can acquire tradable RECs from independent power
producers; the RECs exist as a separate commodity to be traded and
transferred, if allowed by the state.8 7
As a matter of global policy, fourteen nations mandate RPS
programs, and additionally, several nations allow their states to
implement RPS." Twenty-nine U.S. states and the District of
Columbia have some form of RPS. 89 These mandatory RPS programs
cover about half of nationwide retail electricity sales. 90 The RPS
programs in the states are very different in terms of what
technologies qualify. The required state percentage of energy
delivered from renewables currently ranges from two to forty

86. See generally Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last updated Sept. 27,
2012).
87. See Renewable Energy Certificates, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/gpmarket/rec.htm (last updated Oct. 16, 2012).
88. KPMG INT'L, TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY 47-49
tbl.2
(2012),
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndlnsights/
ArticlesPublications/Documents/taxes-incentives-renewable-energy-2012.pdf
(countries using Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) include Belgium, Canada
(some states), Italy, Japan, Portugal, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States (twenty-nine states); developing countries include Chile,
Romania, China, Philippines, and Kyrgyzstan).
89. See Solar Carve-Outs in Renewable Portfolio Standards, DATABASE OF ST.
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/
solarpolicyguide/?id=21 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
90. RYAN WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L
LABORATORY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD IN THE UNITED STATES: A
STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, at 1 (2008), http://emp.lbl.gov/
sites/all/files/REPORT%/o201bnl-154e-revised.pdf.
INCENTIVES
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percent of annual retail sales in different state programs. 9 1 The
current RPS standards are projected to add 76,750 MW of additional
renewable generation by 2025. 92 In order to comply with the RPS
requirements, electric utilities can purchase RECs from eligible
renewable generation.
Most states allow solar, wind, biomass, and landfill gas resources
to qualify in RPS programs; states are less consistent regarding
eligibility for biogas, municipal solid waste, geothermal, all hydro
resources, fuel cells, and ocean tidal renewable resources to qualify.9 3
Some states include co-generation while West Virginia and
Massachusetts include coal gasification. 94 Ohio qualified as eligible
for renewable RPS credits for the recapturing of gas wasted in blast
furnace operation and for residual electricity production. 95 In 2012,
Oregon proposed making nuclear power eligible for renewable
credits. 96 Many RPS programs target only new renewable projects
commencing operation after enactment of the state RPS program. 97
Solar-specific RPS designs in eleven states and the District of

91. See Summary Tables, DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &

EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables (last visited Jan 14. 2014).
92. Plumer, supra note 1.
93. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 90, at 6 n.10; see also Rules, Regulations &
Policiesfor Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &

EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Mar.
16, 2014), which maintains an electronic inventory by each state of eligible
renewable technologies for RPS (click on each state and summary to view the list
of eligible technologies in each state).
94. See generally DATABASE

OF

ST. INCENTIVES

FOR

RENEWABLES

&

EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2014); see also RPS and
APS Program Summaries, MASS. EXECUTIVE OFF. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFF.,

http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-utilities-clean-tech/renewable-energy/rps-aps/rpsand-aps-program-summaries.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
95. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3706.25 (LexisNexis 2013); Bob Matyi, Ohio
Legislation to Pit Steelmaker's Project Against Wind Energy Developers over
RECs, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Mar. 5, 2012 (Ohio did so "to strengthen the economy

and put more people to work.").
96. Geoffrey Craig, State Renewable Mandates Unlikely to Be Reduced or
Repealed this Year, Analysts Say, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Mar. 12, 2012.

97. See Summary Tables, supra note 91 (click on each state to find regulations
for that individual state).
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Columbia include solar or distributed generation set-asides for a
percentage of eligible projects.98
As a sustainable policy tool, these RPS programs have had an
impact: over fifty percent of the non-hydro renewable capacity
additions in the United States for the decade from 1998 through 2007
occurred in states with RPS programs; "[ninety-three percent] of
these additions came from wind power, [four percent] from biomass,
[two percent] from solar, and [one percent] from geothermal"
resources. 99 RPS programs have been characterized as a form of
back-door renewable subsidies.100
While effective as a policy tool, several state RPS programs can be
legally vulnerable. There are a number of the twenty-nine states with
RPS which have incorporated credit multipliers, restrictions, or
preferences to promote in-state/in-region generation of power, to the
exclusion of external power. They constitute approximately threequarters of those states with RPS programs.101 This geographic
discrimination for the location of generation of power that creates
RECs falls into the following categories:
* Eight of the twenty-nine RPS states, or twenty-seven
percent, have REC multipliers for in-state generation:
Maine,105
Delaware,104
Colorado,103
Arizona,102
106
107
109
10
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, and Washington.10
* Four of the RPS states, or fourteen percent of the RPS
states, including two that also provide for a
geographically discriminatory REC multiplier, have either
98. WISER & BARBOSE, supra note 90, at 1.

99. Id.
100. Robert Glennon & Andrew Reeves, Solar Energy's Cloudy Future, 1 ARIZ.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 93, 106 (2010).
101. Twenty-three of twenty-nine RPS states have some form of geographic
discrimination.
102. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1806 (2012).
103. COLo. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124 (2013).
104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356 (2013).
105. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3605 (2013).
106. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1039 (2013).
107. Mo. REV. STAT. § 393.1030(1) (2013).
108. NEV. REV. STAT.§ 704.7822 (2013).
109. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 194-37-110 (2013).
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a requirement or preference for in-state generation:
California,no Colorado,"' North Carolina,112 and Ohio.113
Four of the twenty-nine RPS states give program
preferences to the use of in-state manufactured products
or in-state labor forces: Arizona,114 Delaware,
Michigan,116 and Montana'
Eleven of the twenty-nine RPS states, representing thirtyeight percent of RPS states, have a requirement for inregion, rather than in-state, geographic location of
generation to create RECs, including one of the states that
also has in-state multipliers and one with an in-state
Maine,120
Illinois,"1 9
Connecticut,18
preference:
Maryland,121 Massachusetts,122 New Hampshire,123 North
Carolina, Ohio, 124 Oregon, 125 Pennsylvania, 126 and Rhode
Island. 127
Some states have multiple multipliers and preferences.
Only seven of the twenty-nine states have no geographic
preference in their laws.

110. See California:Incentives/Policiesfor Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE
OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/

incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive Code=CA25R&re=1&ee=1 (last updated Oct.
30, 2013) (explaining that a maximum of twenty-five percent of RPS compliance
can be achieved through the use of tradable renewable energy credits; therefore, the
remainder of the RPS compliance must be attained through in-state power sales).
111. COLo. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(e)(II)-(III) (2013).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e) (2013).
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2013).
114. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1807 (2012).
115. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 351 (2013).
116. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1001 (2009).
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2005(3)(a) (2013).
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a(b) (2013).
119. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 3855/1-56(b) (2013).
120. 65-407-311 ME. CODE R. § 6 (LexisNexis 2011).
121. MD. CODE REGS. 20.61.03.03 (2014).
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 25A, § 1 1F (2013).
123. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6 (2013).
124. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64 (West 2012).
125. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 469A.135(1)(b) (2012).
126. 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648.4 (West 2013).
127. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26-4(d) (2013).
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About three-quarters of California's thirty-three percent renewable
energy goal must come from California pursuant to state regulation.
Parts V and VI will examine why these in-state preference RPS
programs raise constitutional issues.1 28
B. System Benefit Charges

A system benefits charge (SBC) is a per-kWh power surcharge
imposed on all retail electricity consumers within a state utility's
service territory through monthly utility bills, which creates an
additional state-controlled or administered energy fund. 129 These
state renewable trust funds distribute money to subsidize various
renewable energy resource projects and technologies pursuant to state
legislation.130 Approximately one-third of U.S. states have enacted
SBC and "public benefit funds:" 1 3 1 fifteen states, plus the District of
Columbia are included, where a small surcharge is added on
electricity bills. 132 The funds created range in size from less than $1
million to greater than $300 million per year.133 A number of these
states, either explicitly or as a matter of practice, will only fund
sustainable energy projects within their own states, even though

128. See infra Parts V, VI.
129. See generally Public Benefits Funds for Renewables, DATABASE OF ST.

2013, http://www.dsireusa.org/
documents/summarymaps/PBFMap.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2014); see New York
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY: FEBRUARY

Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency: Systems Benefits Charge,

http://www.dsireusa.org/
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive Code=NYO7R (last updated Jan. 14, 2013)
("New York's system benefits charge (SBC), established in 1996 by the New York
Public Service Commission (PSC), supports energy efficiency, education and
outreach, research and development, and low-income energy assistance. To support
the SBC program, the state's six investor-owned electric utilities collect funds from
customers through a surcharge on customers' bills.").
130. Id.
131. ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL
REPORT NREL/TP-6A2-46667, STATE OF THE STATES 2009: RENEWABLE ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 65-66 (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fylOosti/46667.pdf.
DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY,

132. See Public Benefits Funds for Renewables, supra note 129.
133. See State Clean Energy Funds Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,

http://www.epa.gov/chp/policies/fundsfs.html (last updated June 7, 2013).
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power from all sources inside and outside the state are taxed to create

the SBC fund. 13 4
C. Net Metering

Net metering is federally mandated in twenty countries,135 as well
as in forty-three states in the United States. 136 Net metering is the
most utilized state incentive for renewable power nationwide.137 Net
metering is an accounting concept typically applied to renewable
sources of distributed power self-generated on the utility customer's
side of the retail utility meter.138 Each of the forty-three state net
metering programs is distinct. There are differences as to allowable
sizes of units, the vintage and longevity of credits, whether credits
can be cashed out, eligible classes of customers, and eligible
technologies. 139
If net metered, the distributed power generation unit is connected
to a retail bi-directional meter that measures the amount of total
energy used and produced by the customer. When the customer uses
electricity from the distribution company, the meter runs forward;
when more electricity is produced from the facility than is consumed
by the customer, the excess is sent to the electricity grid, running the
meter in reverse direction and reversing the net accounting of power
flow. 140
By turning the meter backwards, since only a single rate applies to
a single meter, net metering effectively compensates the generator at,
or near, the full retail rate (which includes approximately two-thirds
134. See PublicBenefits Fundsfor Renewables, supra note 129.
135. See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,

RENEWABLES

2012

GLOBAL

STATUS

REPORT

70-72

(2012),

http://

www.map.ren21.net/GSR/GSR2012 low.pdf (developed countries utilizing net
metering include Belgium, Canada (some states), Denmark, Greece, Israel, Japan,
Portugal, and the United States (forty-three states); developing countries include
Mexico, Guatemala, Jordan, Pakistan, and Philippines).
136. Public Benefits Fundsfor Renewables, supra note 129.
137. Id.

138. Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. Ass'N, http://www.seia.org/policy/
distributed-solar/net-metering (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
139. See Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, supra note 93

(click on individual states under the "Net Metering" column).
140. Net Metering, supra note 138.
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of the retail bill that is attributable to transmission, distribution, and
taxes) for transferring just the wholesale energy commodity-the
power itself.141 This multiplies by several-fold the effective value or
revenue earned from the wholesale power transaction. While most
states compensate the generator for excess generation at the avoided
cost or market-determined wholesale rate, some states compensate
the wholesale energy seller for the excess power at or very near the
much higher retail rate. 142
Net metering operates as an incentive, applied to renewable power
sources or combined heat and power units (CHP or cogeneration)
built on the site of the customer. All utilities in all states have been
required by federal law for the past six years to make net metering
available to all requesting customers. 143 Nonetheless, not all states do
this. Some states that allow net metering put a limit on the percentage
of total power that can be net metered to avoid the problem of net
metering power back to the utility when the utility does not need the
144
power.
In Massachusetts, as in some other states, there is a statutory cap
on net metering capacity.145 There is an exception of an additional
141. As to whether electricity is a "good" or a "service" and how it should be
treated under the law, see STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO
ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION 211-31 (2000).
142. Twenty-three of the forty-three net metering states will pay a cash value to
net-metered customers for surplus credits. Three of these twenty-three states will
calculate the cash value payment at or near a higher rate retail rate, rather than at
avoided cost. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 18.00 (2013) (setting forth transferable credit
amounts in Massachusetts at slightly below the retail power sale rate); Letter from
Thomas J. May, President, NSTAR Electric, Terms and Conditions-Distribution
Service M.D.T.E. No. 200A (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://
www.nstaronline.com/docs3/tariffs/200.pdf (setting forth NSTAR utility net
metering rates in Massachusetts); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216B.164 (West 2013)
(option for the customer to either receive a payment or receive a credit on its next
month bill at the retail rate); Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. 05-EP-6 (Sept.
18, 1992) (renewable energy source paid at the utility's retail rate); see also R.I.
GEN. LAWS §39-26-6 (2013); see generally Public Benefits Funds for Renewables,
supra note 129.
143. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
144. Mary Powers, MarylandRegulatory Staff Takes Side of Solar Producerson
Net Metering Issues, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Aug. 16, 2010, at 24.

145. 220

MASS. CODE REGS.

18.07 (2013).
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three percent of peak load for net metering facilities where the Host
Customer is a municipality or other government entity.146 There is an
aggregate limit of 10 Mw for the particular municipality undertaking
net metering at multiple locations. 147 Massachusetts has a virtual net
metering that is more far-reaching than the other states1 48 because net
metering credits can be transferred to other customers in the utility
service territory. A host customer may revise as often as twice per
year its designated recipients of net metering credits and the
percentage of credits that they receive.149 Net metering makes a
cross-subsidy from all ordinary consumers to net-metered customers.
D. Feed-In-Tariffs

FiTs are requirements imposed on regulated utilities to purchase
certain designated power generation, typically renewable power
generation or CHP at prices set at values well in excess of the market
value of wholesale power. Therefore, the purchasing utilities are
forced to "buy high" in terms of other electric power available in the
market, which may conflict with other pressure on utilities to
economize prudently in the cost of the power that they supply and
charge to their typically captive retail customers. FiTs
administratively torque the operating power market in favor of the
sellers of certain power.
FiTs are the most used incentive for renewables in both non-United
States developed and developing countries.15 0 Feed-in tariffs have

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 220 MASS. CODE REGS. 8.04(2), 11.04(7), 18.03 (2013).

149. Mass. Dep't. Pub. Utils., Order Adopting Model Net Metering Tariff, 0903-A § V(A) (Aug. 20, 2009), available at http://www.env.state.ma.us/dpu/docs/
electric/09-03/82009noiord.pdf; see also 220 CMR 16.00 (2002).
150. KPMG INT'L, supra note 88, at 46-49 tbl.2. For FiT programs, developed

countries include Australia (some states), all of the European Union countries
except Belgium, Netherlands and Norway; Italy, Japan, Croatia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Developing countries include
Algeria, Argentina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Costa Rico, Dominican
Republic, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, Serbia,
South Africa, Turkey, Uruguay, Armenia, China, Ecuador, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Mondova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Ukraine, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. In sum, slightly less than sixty countries inflate
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been successful in encouraging significant renewable energy
development in nearly all of the countries in which they have been
deployed,15 1 but can impose significant costs on captive utility
ratepayers. These feed-in tariffs exceed substantially utility-avoided
costs and wholesale power purchase costs, and therefore are justified
only by their achieved results, and not typically accepted ratemaking
methodology under U.S. law to minimize prudent generating costs.152
Costs of a feed-in tariff are passed on to consumers by the FiT
purchasing energy suppliers and reflect a public policy regulatory
decision to increase the percentage of renewable electricity sources in
use.
E. Carbon Control Regulation

In the absence of federal climate change legislation in the United
States, nine eastern states have combined into the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to regulate CO 2 from large power
plants.153 California has begun comprehensive regulation of all
greenhouse gases (GHGs) from all sources,154 other western 15 and
Midwestern1 56 states initiated but later postponed or abandoned
the wholesale power tariff paid to sellers through FiT policies to promote
renewable power. Id.
151. ANNE HELD ET AL., FRAUNHOFER INSTITUTE SYSTEMS AND INNOVATION
RESEARCH, FEED-IN SYSTEMS IN GERMANY, SPAIN AND SLOVENIA: A COMPARISON

26 (2007).
152. See FERREY, supra note 27, § 5:9.
153. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org (last

visited Jan. 14, 2014). Ten states signed the RGGI Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), however, New Jersey withdrew and other states have considered
withdrawal from this cap-and-trade program.
154. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 38500-38599 (2013).
155. The Western Climate Initiative is a group of seven western states and two
Canadian provinces that planned to release a carbon restriction program to cut
GHG emissions fifteen percent below 2005 levels. See Ethan Howland, Power
Lines, Renewables, Climate Change Are at Top of New Mexico Agenda in 2008,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 14, 2008; Lisa Weinzimer, California Regulators Call
for "First Seller" Variation of Cap-and-Trade GHG Approach, ELECTRIC UTIL.
WEEK, Feb. 18, 2008.
156. These states include Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota and
Wisconsin, and the Canadian province of Manitoba. The three states of Indiana,
Ohio, and South Dakota opted out of this scheme and are now observers. See
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global warming gas mitigation. The California carbon scheme
requires that California reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by
2020, considering all in-state and out-of-state generation used to
serve California electric load.157 RGGI only regulates CO 2 and only
regulates the electric power sector, and then only larger plants in that
sector; California regulates all GHGs, including CO 2 . RGGI began in
2009; California's carbon program was delayed by several lawsuits
until 2013.
Because states do not want the carbon costs they impose on their
in-state power generators to promote higher-carbon out-of-state
power imports, they consider securing their borders, or at least
surcharge and dissuade intruding high-carbon power flows. 158 A
major practical and policy problem identified by the RGGI states, 159
as well as California, 16 0 is so-called "leakage" into the state of lesscostly power whose carbon content is not regulated or affected. 16 1
California imports power from eleven states, including a large
generally Dean Scott, Midwestern States to Draw up Model Rule Beyond of 2008 to

Implement Cap-and-Trade, 39 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 343 (Feb. 22, 2008); Nora
Macaluso, Midwest States to Commence Work on Details of Regional Climate
Strategy, 38 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2556 (Nov. 30, 2007).
157. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 38500-38599 (2013). The bill sets a firm limit on GHG emissions in
California by requiring the Air Resources Board to determine California's GHG
emission level in 1990 and then issue regulations causing GHG emissions to be
reduced to that level by 2020). Id.
158. See DAVID FARNSWORTH ET AL., REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE AND RGGI: EVALUATING MARKET DYNAMICS,
MONITORING OPTIONS AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION MECHANISMS 2-3, 54-59

(2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/il report final 3 14 07.pdf.
159. Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Dec.
20, 2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/moufinal 12 20 05.pdf.
160. Cap-and-Trade Program, AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/
cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2014).
161. See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 158, at ES 1-2; RGGI states such as
New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and New Delaware are bordered by states that
are not signatories to RGGI and do historically produce a large volume of
electricity from coal-fueled power plants. Similarly, California imports power from
eleven states, including a large amount of coal-fired power. See 2006 Gross System
Electricity Production, CAL. ENERGY ALMANAC, http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/
electricity/systempower/2006_grosssystempower.html
(last updated Feb. 3,
2014) (showing California imports approximately ten percent of its total electricity
from out of state coal plants).
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amount of coal-fired power, and its choice to regulate carbon at the
point of generation is necessary for California to get at the problem
of high-carbon power leakage into the state. 162
The RGGI Staff Working Group found that a substantial
proportion of CO 2 emissions avoided by RGGI could be offset by
corresponding increases in non-RGGI states, with early modeling
showed leakage as high as ninety percent depending on the
programmatic assumptions, which was reduced to leakage of CO 2
between fifty-seven percent and forty percent over the life of the
RGGI program. 163 The governors in affected states agreed to "pursue
technically sound measures to prevent leakage from undermining the
integrity of the [p]rogram."l64 For the discussion of constitutional
issues addressed later in this paper, 165 it is of note now that wholesale
electricity is moving constantly in interstate commerce at the speed
of light.166
F.

Consumer Pushbackon State Regulation

1. Costs and Cross-Subsidies
Each of these five state incentives has in common that it invisibly
transfers costs, with no notation on the consumer bill, from all nonparticipating ratepayers to ratepayers who take advantage of these
incentives. While this is one positive factor of the renewable power
development incentives, the incentive cost is borne not by the utilities
or the state, but by other electricity consumers.
a. Net Metering

Net metering subsidizes designated renewable on-site generation
by allowing its producers to utilize the distribution system to store

162. See Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Rapporteur's Summary at the
Harvard Electricity Policy Group Forty-Ninth Plenary Session 39 (Dec. 6-7, 2007),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/RapporteurReportl2-07.pdf.
163. Id. at 42.
164. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 159, at 10.
165. See infra Parts V, VI.
166. See FERREY, supra note 27, § 2:1; Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law
in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass, and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L.

REv. 1839, 1914 (2004).
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electric energy without paying any pro rata per Kwh cost for this
distribution and energy banking/storage service. This power can be
reclaimed at any time by the original producer, again without paying
any share of the costs of the distribution system that redelivers this
power to the customer. Since distribution and transmission expenses
can be the largest share of total retail electricity costs, 167 this storage
allows the renewable energy project to move and later use power at
less than half the actual tariffed cost of the utility system performing
this function, with the net metered customer still relying substantially
on grid services. Utilities in California estimate that net metering
may result in as much as $1.4 billion each year in lost revenue, which
will be passed on to customers in higher rates for the fixed costs of
transmission and distribution.
b. Renewable Portfolio Standards
Renewable portfolio standards subsidize designated renewable
energy technologies by creating a new tradable virtual renewable
energy certificate and simultaneously imposing a regulatory
requirement on state utilities and their ratepayers constantly to
purchase a specified number of those certificates from the private
projects. Therefore, there is a new expense imposed on the utilities
and passed on entirely to other utility ratepayers, and the cash
proceeds are transferred to operators of renewable energy projects. 169

167. Review any utility tariff; transmission and distribution costs can exceed the
wholesale cost of the energy commodity. Compare, for example, Business Rates,
NSTARONLINE.COM,
http://www.nstaronline.com/ss3/business/rates tariffs/rates/
rates.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2013), which shows transmission and distribution
rates, with a $0.045/Kwh average wholesale price of energy in New England, as
shown at real-time information of instantaneous locational marginal prices of
wholesale power in each zone of New England, ISO NEW ENGLAND,
http://www.iso-ne.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (showing a 10:00 AM
instantaneous price of approximately $250/Mwh, $0.025/Kwh).
168. Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2013, at Bl.
169. Ethan Howland & Pam Radtke Russell, RPS Repeal Is Eyed in Some States
But Chances of Success Are Unclear, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 24, 2011, at 1, 39;
Lisa Wood, Green Advocates in Maine Fear RGGI Funds May Be Used to Close
Budget Gap, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Jan. 24, 2011, at 8-9.
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c. Renewable System Benefit Charges

Renewable system benefit charges raise direct subsidies that can be
dispensed by state governments to specified private electric power
development facilities. These amounts are collected through the
utility regulatory system on all Kwh of power sold originating from
any in-state or external source, and then dispersed discretionarily to
private power projects, typically within the state.
d. FiTs

FiTs establish an above-market price for the energy commodity for
specified renewable or distributed power, which without regulatory
order, would not be purchased at that price by a retail utility in the
market. The utility is ordered by regulation to purchase amounts of
this above-market-cost power, and the above-market costs are passed
on entirely to the utilities' customers. FiTs cause a regulated
(typically monopoly) supplier of retail power to increase its costs of
acquiring certain quantities of wholesale power for eventual
distribution at retail. A recent article noted that California utilities
have been locking in long-term rates with developers that are often
two to four times higher than what they pay for nonrenewable power
sources. 170
Governments have had difficulty in not overpaying under FiTs. In
2011, Oregon lowered the price paid under its solar feed-in tariff for
the third time in its one year of existence, reducing it from its original
sixty-five cents/Kwh to 37.4 cents/Kwh. Each of the prior Oregon
iterations at high prices was oversubscribed within less than ten
minutes of its availability, even though each time the tariff was
lowered ten to twenty percent from the prior availability.172 State
officials claimed they were looking for the "sweet spot."1 73

170. California's Coming Green-Outs, supra note 5 ("California residents and

businesses already pay rates that are [twenty-five percent] to [sixty-percent] higher
than the national average.").
171. Pam Russell, Oregon Reduces Solar Feed-In Tarifffor Third Time, Looking

for 'Sweet Spot'Price,ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Aug. 8, 2011, at 7.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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e. Carbon and GHG Regulation
In ten Northeast states and in California, the acquisition of these
carbon emission certificates to allow operation of larger fossil-fueled
power projects is at a cost to the owners of the power facilities. These
costs are passed on in the increased price of electricity in wholesale
and retail consumer power markets. One report found that RGGI cost
New Hampshire retail ratepayers about $5.50/year in extra costs
passed through to them by utilities which paid for carbon allowances
associated with generation. 17 4 The ten Northeast RGGI states used
the approximately $900 million of RGGI auction proceeds realized
during 2009-2011; fifty-two percent for energy efficiency, eleven
percent for renewable energy, fourteen percent in order to reduce
consumer rates, and one percent for other programs.175
2. Opposition
The California PUC Division of Ratepayer Advocates criticized
the rapid escalation in California ratepayer costs to achieve the RPS
mandate. 176 The cost of RPS compliance exceeded the cost of the
power itself.17 7 The California Division of Ratepayer Advocates
reported "that the California Public Utilities Commission has
'approved nearly every renewable contract filed by the utilities, even
when they rate poorly on least-cost, best-fit criteria. ,,178
The [California] PUC . . . has greenlighted all but two of

184 green-energy proposals since 2002 ....
The state Division of Ratepayer Advocates, whose
purpose is to represent consumers, concluded in a report
last year [2011] that the power contracts the PUC has been
approving have put consumers on the hook for $6 billion in
excess costs. "What the commission's practice has been is
not to consider the cost of renewable power but to approve
174. Lisa Wood, RGGI Cost Data in New Hampshire Renews Opponents

Demandfor State to Quit Program, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 7, 2011, at 10.
175. Id.

176. Geoffrey Craig, Renewable Costs of California's Three Big Utilities Soared
Last Year, CPUC Data Shows, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 13, 2012, at 18.

177. Id.
178. California'sComing Green-Outs, supra note 5.
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every renewable project that came before them," said Joe
Como, acting director of the division. "We really spent too
much money. It's frustrating as hell."1 79
Some utilities have objected to having to pass these fees on as a
cost of the power that they purchase. San Diego Gas & Electric
Company alleged that net metering provided an "unfair and
unsustainable subsidy" of approximately thirty-four dollars from
each other customer.'so The President of NRG Energy noted that
more distributed solar and wind power is forcing utilities to spread
fixed costs over fewer customers, increasing the cost to remaining
customers.181 States that considered possible curtailment or repeal of
their RPS programs include about half of the RPS states: Colorado,
Montana, Wisconsin, Arizona, New Mexico, New Hampshire, and
Maine.182 New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York, picked the
pocket of part of their RGGI funds.1 83
Governor Christie through executive action pulled New Jersey out
of RGGI. Other states have or are considering diluting their RPS
programs by broadening the definition of "renewable" energy eligible
for RPS subsidies to include technologies not normally associated
with renewable energy:
* Allowing existing, rather than only new, resources to
qualify. 184

179. Evan Halper, et al., Taxpayers, Ratepayers Will Fund California Solar
Plants, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/
sep/20/local/la-me-bigsolar-20120921.
180. Lisa Weinzimer, Consumer and Solar Groups Pan SDG&E's Planned
Surcharge,Saying It May Be Illegal, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Nov. 21, 2011, at 18.
181. Engblom, supra note 15.
182. Howland & Russell, supra note 169; Wood, supra note 169.
183. Wood, supra note 169; Lisa Wood & Rob Matyi, New Leadership in
Several States May Weaken 'Green' Mandates, Citing Cost Considerations,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Feb. 14, 2011, at 34-35. New Jersey took $90 million from
its RGGI proceeds to reduce general state budget deficits, and in March 2010, New
Jersey Governor Christie indicated he was planning to take $65 million from the
New Jersey RGGI Fund for a similar purpose. Wood, supra note 169.
184. This applies to considerations in Connecticut and Washington. See Herman
K. Trabish, Numbers from the War on State Renewable Standards, GREENTECH
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* Oregon, Montana, and Maine are adding previously
ineligible hydropower. 85
* Maryland has considered including natural gas-power
electric generation.186
* Wisconsin has considered including nuclear power
generation.18 7
* West Virginia and Massachusetts allow coal-derived fuels
producing power to qualify.1 88
V. STATE RENEWABLE ENERGY LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES

A.

The "Bright"FederalistLine Createdby Congress and the
Constitution

Federalist forms of government denote a system in which political
sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central federal
authority and constituent states or provinces. 189 In these schemes,
there must be a division between state and federal jurisdiction. In the
United States, the Federal Power Act (in sections 205 and 206)190
empowers the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
exclusively regulate rates for the interstate and wholesale sale and
transmission of electricity. 191 The U.S. Supreme Court held that
Congress meant to draw a "bright line," easily ascertained and not
requiring case-by-case analysis, between state and federal
jurisdiction. 19 2 When a transaction is subject to exclusive federal
FERC jurisdiction and regulation, state regulation is preempted as a
(Mar. 25, 2013), www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/numbers-fromthe-war-on-state-renewables-standards.
185. Id.
186. Id.
MEDIA

187. Id.

188. Id.
189. Such federalist forms of government describe several large and established
countries, such as the United States, Germany and India, as well as Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Switzerland.
190. Federal Power Act §§ 205, 206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (2012).
191. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util.

Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
192. Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964).
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matter of federal law and the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause,
according to a long-standing and consistent line of rulings by the
U.S. Supreme Court. 193
Although "FERC has exclusive authority to determine the
reasonableness of wholesale rates . . ."194 states retain authority over
retail electric sales because "FERC's jurisdiction over the sale of
power has been specifically confined to the wholesale market."l 95
The Federal Power Act (FPA) defines "sale at wholesale" as any sale
to any person for resale.1 96 If states impose a rate in excess of
avoided cost by either "law or policy," the "contracts will be
considered to be void ab initio." 97 Since FERC has exclusive
authority to determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates, 198 the
Supreme Court consistently has reaffirmed and enforced the Filed
Rate Doctrine, as will be explained below, when states attempted to
assert jurisdiction inconsistent with FERC's exclusive authority over
wholesale rate and term determinations.1 99

193. See New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). The
Supreme Court overturned an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities
Commission that restrained within the state, for the financial advantage of in-state
ratepayers, low-cost hydroelectric energy produced within the state. It held this to
be an impermissible violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, and the Federal Power Act: "Our cases
consistently have held that the commerce clause of the Constitution .. . precludes a
state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over
out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the
products derived therefrom." Id. at 338. See also Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore,
487 U.S. 354 (1988); Energy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39
(2003) (discussing whether state regulation of energy is permissible under the
Commerce Clause).
194. Miss. Power,487 U.S. at 355.
195. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
196. Federal Power Act § 20 1(d), 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d).
197. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 FERC 61,012, 61,029-30 (1995).
198. Miss. Power,487 U.S. at 371.
199. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
530-31 (2008); Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 47
(2003); Miss. Power, 487 U.S. at 354; Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,
476 U.S. 953, 963 (1986) (the Filed Rate Doctrine limitations also apply

decisions of state courts.").

..

.

to
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Subsequently, this has created a well-established legal dividing line
in U.S. law between federal and state government authority to
regulate transactions of the private electric power industry. Because
of the implied "bright line," 200 it does not make any difference
whether a state acts through its legislature or its energy regulatory
agency,201 but a state must stay on the demarcated "state" side of this
legal "bright line." State regulation is not allowed to stand as an
obstacle to Congressional objectives.202 Nor is state law allowed to
overrule or supplant federal determinations by adding requirements
that are inconsistent with those in federal law.2 03
B. Locational DiscriminationDe Facto or De Jure

Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution states that
"Congress
may regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States . . . ." This so-called dormant Commerce Clause prohibits

actions that are facially discriminatory against interstate
commerce.204 The dormant Commerce Clause restriction is "driven
by concern about 'economic protectionism-that is, regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors."' 205 Discriminatory statutes are
subject to "strict scrutiny," and for such a statute or regulation to be
valid, the state must establish that the statute serves a compelling
state interest through the least restrictive means to achieve that
interest.
Geographically-based restriction on interstate commerce, whether
discriminating for or against local commerce, raises dormant
200. Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964).
201. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 215 (1983).
202. See id. at 204, 212; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
203. Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir.
1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 572 (1987); Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 966
(2012) (holding in a unanimous decision that federal law prohibits states from
enforcing requirements regarding "premises, facilities and operations" that are "in
addition to or different from" those in federal law).
204. See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
205. See id. at 328 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74
(1988)).

2014] CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES IN MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS

291

Commerce Clause concerns. 206 The dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits actions that are facially discriminatory against or unduly
burden interstate commerce. 207 As such, the modern dormant
Commerce Clause case precedent is driven by this concern about
economic protectionism.2 0 8
A court first determines whether state regulation or legislation is
facially discriminatory against interstate commerce, and will only
uphold the state law if a legitimate local purpose can be found. 209 In
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, the Supreme Court noted that an agency

of government cannot discriminate against interstate commerce "if
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve
legitimate local interests, are available." 2 10 For such a statute or
regulation to be upheld, the state must establish that there is a
compelling state interest for which the statute is the least intrusive
means to achieve that interest,211 "even if environmental preservation
were the central purpose of the pricing order, that would not be
sufficient to uphold a discriminatory regulation." 2 12 The scope of
"'commerce" among the states for purposes of a dormant Commerce
Clause analysis is broadly defined,213 and all objects traded in
interstate commerce merit Commerce Clause protection, including
the transmission of electric energy.2 14 In fact, electric energy is one
of the most basic elements of interstate commerce.215

206. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see Davis, 553 U.S 328.

207.
208.
209.
210.

See id. at 338 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100).
See id. at 328 (quoting New Energy Co. 486 U.S. at 273-74).
See id. at 338 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100).
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).

211. Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause,

4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 33, 60-61 (2009) (outlining a history of the
Dormant Commerce Clause).
212. W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1994).
213. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-22 (1978)
(holding that a state cannot discriminate against articles of commerce originating in
other states unless there is a "reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
differently.") (emphasis added).
214. See id.; see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002) (finding that
transmissions on the interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in
interstate commerce).
215. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
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Except for the necessity to quarantine certain products, a
compelling state requirement is rarely found. Statutes found to
discriminate against out-of-state interests based on geography or
favoring local interests, are found to be per se invalid. 216 If the statute
is geographically even-handed, the courts apply the Pike balancing
test to determine whether the state's interest justifies the incidental
discriminatory effect of the regulatory mechanism as applied. 217 State
and local laws are deemed unconstitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause when a law differentiates between in-state and
out-of-state economic interests in a manner that benefits the former
and burdens the latter.218
VI. THE MATRIX: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE
RENEWABLE POLICY

Renewable energy incentives are a new creation, and successful
legal challenges followed recently:
* California in 2011 lost defending its feed-in tariffs for
renewable power.219
* California in 2011 lost a suit on its carbon control capand-trade regulation, resulting in an additional year of
delay in the program until 2013 while it made
- -

revisions.

220

216. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (noting that if a statute is facially

discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
278, 287 (1997); Stiles, supra note 211, at 60-61; Patrick R. Jacobi, Renewable
Portfolio Standard GeneratorApplicability Requirements: How States Can Stop
Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REv. 1070,

1101 (2006) (predicting that a court will likely strike down as unconstitutional any
regulation that discriminates geographically or through point-of-origin).
217. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (explaining the
balancing test for when a "statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental .... ).
218. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
219. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC
61,047, 26 (2010) (Order on
Petitions for Declaratory Order).
220. See id. at 35; Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., CPF-09509562 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011) (order granting in part petition for writ of mandate).
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* California in 2012 had its low carbon fuel standard
declared as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause,
although later reversed by a split Ninth Circuit decision in
2013, withholding a later decision as to whether it also
violated the Supremacy Clause. 221
* California in 2013 lost a constitutional challenge when
the U.S. Supreme Court found its vehicle regulation was
preempted by federal law. 222
* A challenge by regional generators of power in the midAtlantic states against New Jersey's in-state energy
facility location preferences for new power generation
was successful, resulting in a change in FERC-approved
regional PJM procedures, 223 and in 2013, ruled still
unconstitutional by federal court.
* A successful 2013 challenge by regional generators of
power against Maryland's in-state energy facility location
preferences for new power generation.22 4
* A constitutional suit on renewable power incentives in
Colorado stalled on procedural grounds. 225
* An initial court ruling in 2011 that the Missouri RPS
program was illegal, which was reversed at the end of
226
2012 and is on appeal.
* A successful settlement of suit in 2010 against New
227
York's RGGI carbon regulation.

221. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 843 F. Supp. 2d
1071, 1094, 1103 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
222. See Am. Trucking Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2105
(2013).

223. See PJM Interconnection LLC, 135 FERC 61,022 (2011).
224. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 5432346 (D. Md.
Sept. 30, 2013).
225. See Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94559; Am.
Tradition Inst. v. Colo., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2012).
226. See State ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass'n. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No.
10AC-CC00512 (Cir. Ct. June 29, 2011), rev'd, 386 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. Ct. App.
2012).

227. See Press Release, Peter A. Barden, Indeck Energy Sues State Questioning
Legality of Regional Greenhouse Gas
Program (Jan. 29, 2009) (on file with Barden).
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* An additional suit against New York's participation in
RGGI, dismissed on standing grounds without reaching
the merits. 228
* A federal court ruling that Vermont regulation of its
wholesale power preferences and sales violated the U.S.
Constitution, subsequently upheld by the federal Second
Circuit. 229
* A successful settled suit alleging that Massachusetts'
renewable energy incentives violated the Constitution.230
* A unanimous declaration in July 2013 by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals that state RPS programs, which
discriminate against creation of renewable credits by outof-state power production (as two-thirds of RPS states
do),231 are unconstitutional violations of the dormant
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 232
A.

The Supremacy Clause RestrictingState FiTs, Certain Carbon
ControlRegulation, and CertainNet Metering Regulation

1. The "Bright Line"
Federal jurisdiction arises because electricity moves almost at the
speed of light in interstate commerce across an interconnected grid in
the forty-eight continental U.S. states, 233 according to Kirchhoff's
234
Law. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "it is difficult to conceive
228. See Thrun v. Cuomo, 976 N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2013).
229. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D.
Vt. 2011), aff'd in part,vacated in part,733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
230. See TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS (D.

Mass. filed Apr. 16, 2010).
231. See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).
232. Id.
233. See STEVEN FERREY, UNLOCKING THE GLOBAL WARMING TOOLBOX: KEY
CHOICES FOR CARBON RESTRICTION AND SEQUESTRATION 149 (2010).
234. Steven Ferrey, Efficiency in the Regulatory Crucible: Navigating 21st
Century 'Smart' Technology and Power, 3 GEo. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1,
5 (2012); Kirchhoffs Law states that at any point in an electrical circuit where

charge density is not changing in time, the sum of currents flowing towards that
point is equal to the sum of currents flowing away from that point. Kirchhoff's
Laws, MSU DEP'T OF PHYSICS & ASTRONOMY, http://www.pa.msu.edu/courses/
2000spring/phy232/lectures/kirchhoff/kirchhoff.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
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of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy,
a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or
manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources in
this respect." 23 5 The courts have determined that electrons in
interstate commerce cannot be traced, although we know that they
move effortlessly interstate through the very design of the interstate
transmission system. 236
Moreover, an increasingly large majority of U.S. power now
proceeds through a wholesale power sale prior to its ultimate retail
disposition, 237 thereby fundamentally altering the legal analysis of
what is and is not now constitutional for a state, as opposed to the
federal government, to regulate. 238 A large number of independent
renewable power generators now sell their power wholesale to
redistributing utilities and others that thereafter resell that power to
retail customers:
When combined with federal preemption law, one crucial
result of these energy market regulatory reforms has been
"a massive shift in regulatory jurisdiction from the states to
FERC."

.

.

.

The upshot of these federal and state

innovations in electricity regulation is that state regulators,
despite their continued authority over rates charged directly
to consumers, have much less actual authority over those
rates than they did [earlier]. Local utilities now obtain
power largely through wholesale contracts subject to
FERC's exclusive regulation, rather than through self235. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
236. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7, 32 (2002); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla.
Power & Light Co. 404 U.S. 453, 460 (1972).
237. ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 10

(2006):
In the 1970s, vertically integrated utility companies (investor-owned,
municipal, or cooperative utilities) controlled over [ninety-five] percent of
the electric generation in the United States ... by 2004 electric utilities
owned less than [sixty] percent of electric generating capacity.
Increasingly, decisions affecting retail customers and electricity rates are
split among federal, state, and new private, regional entities.

238. See FERREY, supra note 27, § 1:1; see also FERREY, supra note 10, at 561.
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generated and transmitted power . . . . Although state

regulators formerly took an extremely active role so as to
ensure the just and reasonable retail power rates, FERC
now has exclusive jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that
now drive the electric power market and, as a practical
matter, largely determine the rates ultimately charged to the
public. 239
As they designed their state incentives, states were advised and
cautioned about carefully observing the constitutional limits in
240
treatises,20
books, 241 leading power industry journals, 242 and law
review articles both before legal challenges began243 and after
promulgation of state programs for RPS, FiTs, SBC, net metering,
244
and carbon control.
States that ignored the warnings have been
239. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util.

Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
240. See FERREY, supra note 27, § 5:9, 5:15-18, 10:110-10:113; FERREY, supra
note 141, at 2.
241. FERREY, supra note 141.
242. See Steven Ferrey, Renewable Subsidies in the Age of Deregulation, PUB.
UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 1997, http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/1997/12/

renewable-subsidies-age-deregulation; see also Steven Ferrey, Carbon and the
Constitution: State GHG Policies Confront Federal Roadblocks, PUB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY, Apr. 2009, http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2009/04/carbon-

and-constitution.
243. See Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretionto Environmentally
Sculpt the DeregulatingElectric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 145
(2002); see also Ferrey, supra note 166, (2004); Kristen H. Engel, The Dormant
Commerce Clause Threat to Market-BasedEnvironmentalRegulation: The Case of
Electricity Deregulation,26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999); Steven Ferrey, Sustainable
Energy, Environmental Policy, and States' Rights: Discerning the Energy Future
Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507,

508 (2004).
244. See Steven Ferrey et al., FIT in the U.S.A., PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, June
2010, http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2010/06/fit-usa; see also Steven
Ferrey, Legal Barriers to Sub-National Governance Techniques by US. States for
Renewable Energy Promotion and GHG Control, in Proceedings of the UNITARYale Conference on Environmental Governance and Democracy (2010); Steven
Ferrey et al., Fire and Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control
Mechanisms Confront ConstitutionalBarriers,20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 125
(2010); Robin K. Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and
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either threatened or ordered to pay challengers' millions of dollars of
legal costs of successful constitutional challenge. 245
Congress, in the FPA, "adopt[ed] the test developed in the
Attleboro line [of cases] which denied state power to regulate a sale
'at wholesale to local distributing companies' and allowed state
246
regulation of a sale at 'local retail rates to ultimate consumers."'
As the Court explained, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act
based on testimony that Attleboro "has been accepted by everyone as
establishing . . . the fact that the State cannot regulate wholesale

transactions, although it can regulate retail service and rate." 247

In 1986,248 and again in 1988,249 2003,250 and 2008,251 the Filed
Rate Doctrine (as enforced through the Supremacy Clause) was
reaffirmed and enforced by the Supreme Court. The 1986 Supreme
Court decision concluded that the Filed Rate Doctrine limitations
also apply "to decisions of state courts." 252 The Filed Rate Doctrine is
an absolute prohibition of state regulation over wholesale power
rates, contracts, and terms which are reserved exclusively to federal
authority.253 The Supreme Court in 2008 reiterated that the FPA
Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U.
COLO. L. REV. 771 (2010); Steven Ferrey, Threading the ConstitutionalNeedle
With Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable
Power, 7 TEX. J. OF OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 59 (2012); Steven Ferrey, Goblets of
Fire: State Programson Global Warming and the Constitution, 35 ECOLOGY L. Q.

835 (2009).
245. See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d
183 (D. Vt. 2012), aff'd in part,vacated in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013); PPL
Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 2011 U.S Dist. WL 5007972 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2011)
(plaintiffs were allowed to submit an application for the state to cover their legal
fees); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 5603896 (D.N.J. Oct.
11,2013).
246. Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 214 (1964)
(internal citations omitted).
247. Id. at 213 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
248. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963 (1986).
249. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988).
250. Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003).
251. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527
(2008).
252. NantahalaPower & Light Co., 476 U.S. at 963.

253. The Filed Rate Doctrine is not limited to "rates" per se. Id. ("But [the
Court's] inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or
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creates a 'bright line' [] between state and federal jurisdiction, with
wholesale power sales . . . falling on the federal side of the line." 25 4
This recent decision articulated an unbroken line of Supremacy
Clause applications barring state regulation:
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal
authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in the
regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates. States
may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable
wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting
wholesale rates are reasonable.2 5 5
2. FiTs and Carbon Control Regulation
In 2010 and 2011, FERC issued its most recent rulings on state
FiTs. In CaliforniaPublic Utilities Commission, FERC held that its
authority under the FPA includes the exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of sales for resale of electric
energy in interstate commerce by public utilities. 256 California had
argued that its environmentally beneficial purposes should make it
exempt from federal preemption in setting non-market-conforming
wholesale rates for a state FiT. 257 FERC found that state purpose does
not permit illegal establishment of FiTs requiring purchases of
electricity at inflated wholesale prices,258 and that renewable

volumes of purchases.") (citing N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372
U.S. 84, 90-91 (1963)).
254. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util.

Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
255. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988).
256. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 61,047, 61,337, 61,339 (2010); see,
e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 354, 360-62 (referring to FERC

proceedings where FERC decided on the merits a case involving FiTs for an
electric utility); see generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824d, 824e (2006).
257. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n, 132 FERC 61,327-39.
258. See id. 61,338. FERC rejected all of California's arguments regarding
generic environmental rationales for wholesale rates in excess of limits under
federal law or set by FERC. Id.
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wholesale generators cannot receive more than fair market prices
under federal law.259
FERC's decision renders the European-used option of abovemarket FiTs legally inaccessible to U.S. states except in the context
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) rates
limited to purchasing power at utility avoided costs.260 FERC
reiterated that only the federal government can regulate commerce
among the states and held that California cannot attempt to regulate
commerce outside its borders.2 6 1
In a highly publicized case in 2012, a Vermont federal trial court
found that state regulation of wholesale power pricing was preempted
by federal law and that state law discriminating in favor of in-state
regulation of power moving in interstate commerce violated the
262
dormant Commerce Clause. The Vermont district court in Entergy
Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin found that the FPA vests

FERC with the exclusive authority to regulate the transmission and
sale at wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce, but this
issue was unripe for decision263 and the court held that the state
regulation was unconstitutional on two other grounds. The Second
Circuit recently affirmed this decision on it being an unconstitutional
statute, and found the commerce clause and Federal Power Act
claims unripe.26 4
Preventing RGGI carbon control "leakage" of power around the
edges of state carbon emission regulation can also raise issues of
state authority to regulate power through mechanisms that affect
wholesale prices. 265 In a 2009 suit against the state of New York's
259. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 133 FERC
260. See 18 C.F.R. 292.402(b) (2013).

61,059, 61,264-66 (2010).

261. See Cal. Public Utils. Comm'n, 133 FERC

61,264-66 (observing that

California contested the Commission's decision that "the CPUC's AB 1613
Decision set rates for wholesale sales in interstate commerce, and is therefore
preempted by the FPA.").
262. See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183,
234, 239 (D. Vt. 2012), aff'd in part,vacated in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
263. See id. at 233 (quoting New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S.
331, 340 (1982)); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (FERC's authority under the
FPA).
264. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 433-34 (2d
Cir. 2013).
265. FERREY, supra note 233, at 167-70.
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RGGI program, New York's quick settlement moved substantial
sums of complete financial relief to plaintiffs, and resulted in
Consolidated Edison Company having to pay the cogeneration
project for the cost of its additional carbon allowances through the
266
end of their pre-existing long-term contracts.
The settlement
allowed the utility to ask the New York PSC to pass through the cost
of these allowances, or approximately $3 million annually, to utility
customers. 267 New York's participation in RGGI was challenged a
second time in 2011 by New York ratepayers as being without proper
legislative approval and only implemented by regulation. 268 This case
was denied in 2013 on procedural grounds where the New York
ratepayers lacked standing because their injury was not distinct.2 6 9
Preemption was at issue in a California case in Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union v. Goldstene in which the federal trial court had

already declared that California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS)
law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.270 The trial court found
that California's LCFS law was the state's attempt to regulate
commerce outside its borders and a violation of the federal
government's exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce.271
The court again distinguished motive from constitutional
requirements, holding that "[a]lthough "[the state's] goal to combat
global warming may be 'legitimate,' however, it cannot 'be achieved
by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national

266. See Press Release, supra note 227.
267. Id. In addition to the Indeck project, the Brooklyn Navy Yard CoGeneration Project and Selkirk Cogen Partners also received these complete
settlements of all economic impact shifted to the utility and/or its ratepayers.
268. Thrun v. Cuomo, No. 4358-/11, at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2011); see also
Geoffrey Craig & Gail Roberts, Lawsuit Disputes Legality of New York
Participationin RGGI, Citing Lack of Legislative Approval, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK.,

July 4, 2011, at 10.
269. Judge Allows New York to Participatein Environment Initiative, THOMPSON
June 15, 2012.

REUTERS,

270. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071
(E.D. Cal. 2011).
271. Id.
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economy."'272 In a split decision on appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed.273
3. Net Metering
In 2001, FERC in MidAmerican Energy Company held that federal

law did not preempt state net metering decisions. 274 FERC found that
"no sale occurs when an individual . . . installs generation [for selfsupply] and accounts for its dealings with the utility through the
practice of netting."2 75 Net metering is not a retail or wholesale sale
of power, and therefore not subject to any federal law limitations on
-276
the price implications of net metering.
In the 2009 Sun Edison LLC case, FERC determined that the
Commission lacked jurisdiction over the generator if there was no net
sale of power to the utility over the billing period.277 There is no net
sale unless the customer sells back more energy than the back-up
power it consumes within the billing period. 27 8 Most states have not
conformed their programs to the implied limitation of no net power
export at the end of the period. While neither MidAmerican nor Sun
Edison involved net power flowing from the net-metered generator to
the utility, the findings of both decisions were limited to situations
where there was no net flow of power back to the power grid. 279

272. Id. at 1088-89.
273. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, et al. v. Richard Corey, et al., 730 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert.filed (U.S. Mar. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1148).
274. See MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC 61,340 (2001); In March 2001,
the MidAmerican Energy Company challenged before FERC the state of Iowa's
regulations directing MidAmerican to interconnect with three "[a]lternate energy
facilities and to offer net billing arrangements to those facilities." Id. MidAmerican
also requested a declaratory order stating that federal law preempted these
regulations. Id. MidAmerican asked the commission to undertake enforcement
action against the Iowa Board, or to issue a declaratory order that the final orders of
the Iowa Board are preempted by PURPA. Id.
275. Id.

276.
62263
277.
278.

62263.

Id. 62262 (finding that net metering is not preempted by state law); id.
(finding that all three facilities are a QF).
Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC 61,146, 61,620 (2009).
Id.

279. MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 FERC

61,620.

61,340; Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC
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In Rhode Island, ratepayers challenged state net metering
arrangements where the wind generator at the Portsmouth High
School was directly interconnected to the distribution grid, rather
than first serving a substantial host load, thus having virtually 100%
of net power flow back to the grid.280 The plaintiffs argument
challenged whether an independent wholesale project can be paid
more than the avoided cost afforded to Qualifying Facilities under
PURPA,281 rather than the net metered calculation, which is
approximately 300% of avoided cost.
National Grid, the utility purchaser of the power under net-metered
rates, argued that the wind generator should be grandfathered into
PURPA, with subsequent policy changes applied prospectively, but
that "the credits being paid to the Town from the production at the
facility are effectively reducing the Town's contribution to the cost of
the distribution system through the cross subsidies inherent in the net
metering mechanism, because all other distribution customers are
paying a rate for power that is above market." 282 The Rhode Island
Division of Public Utilities and Carriers Advocacy Unit supported
the ratepayers' complaint against National Grid's policy. 283 After the
suit was initiated, Rhode Island changed the definitions in its state net
metering law to allow the school to allocate its net metering credits to
284
several municipal accounts.
Even though the suit resulted in the

280. See Docket No. D-10-126-Division of Public Utilities and Carriers'
("Division"): Investigation Into Net Metering Complaint Relating to the Town of
Portsmouth Wind Generating Facility, R.I. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, http://

www.ripuc.org/eventsactions/docket/D-10-126page.html (last updated Aug. 29,
2013).
281. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824a-2 (2012).
282. Letter from Thomas R. Teehan, Senior Counsel, National Grid, to Luly E.
Massaro, Division Clerk, Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.ripuc.org/eventsactions/docket/D-10-126NGrid-Reply-Advocacy(2-23-1 1).pdf.
283. See Memorandum from Jon G. Hagopian, Special Assistant Attorney,
Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, to Luly E. Massaro,
Division Clerk, Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (Feb. 2,
2011),
available at
http://www.ripuc.org/eventsactions/docket/D-10-126Advocacy-Memorandum(2-2-10).pdf.
284. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.2-3(a)(1) (2013).
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state changing its law, the challenge that was attempted at FERC,
which declined to get involved, is now on appeal.28 5
The federal trial court in Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v.

Shumlin faced the issue on whether a state can regulate wholesale
28
power transactions from independent generators to utilities.286
The
federal trial court followed longstanding precedent and held against
Vermont in the state's recent attempt to defend state power in
regulating power sale transactions or terms: 287
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.:
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and
federal authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in the
regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates. States
may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable
wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting
wholesale rates are reasonable.
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. Ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S.

354, 374 (1988).... Furthermore, a state "must ... give
effect to Congress' desire to give FERC plenary authority
over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the States
do not interfere with this authority." Nantahala Power &
Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) ....
Under the "filed-rate doctrine," state courts and
regulatory agencies are preempted by federal law from
requiring the payment of rates other than the federal filed
rate. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 539

U.S. 39, 47 (2003) ... ("The filed rate doctrine requires
'that interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by
FERC must be given binding effect by state utility
285. Benjamin Riggs v. Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, 138 FERC
61,172 (2012). On December 15, 2011, Benjamin Riggs filed a complaint with
FERC against the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission claiming that the PUC
November 30, 2011, decision violated the Federal Power Act and FERC
regulations because it allows a rate for renewable energy that exceeds the
incremental cost to the relevant electric utility of alternate energy.
286. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 190 (D.
Vt. 2012), aff'd in part,vacated in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).

287. Id.
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(quoting

FERC reaffirmed and clarified longstanding precedent in its 2010
declaratory
order
regarding
California Public Utilities
Commission.289 California argued that its environmental purposes
should make it exempt from preemption in setting above-market
wholesale feed-in renewable tariff rates for cogeneration facilities.29 0
FERC rejected all of California's arguments.2 9 1
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Applied to RPS, SBC, and
Carbon Control Regulation

The dormant Commerce Clause affects state regulation or law
where the state imposes regulations that differentiate private entities
based on their geographic origin of commerce. Dormant Commerce
Clause challenges are distinct from the constitutional jurisdictional
issues discussed above 2 92 and are governed by different articles of the
Constitution. The former is defined by Article I prohibitions on
burdensome state regulation of interstate commerce of a fundamental
technology, 293 while the latter is governed by Article VI, the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause which establishes a judicially
defined "bright line" prohibition of state regulation of wholesale
transactions in power. 294
The Constitution and the dormant Commerce Clause prohibit states
from discriminating against out-of-state resources in energy
commerce. A state can neither regulate in favor of or require the use

288. Id. at 233-34.
289. See generally Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 61,047 (2010) (Order
on Petitions for Declaratory Order).
290. Id. 61,327-28.
291. Id. 61,325, 61,338.
292. See supra Part VI.A.
293. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
294. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.");
see also supra Part VI.A.
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of its own in-state energy resources,295 nor can the state regulate to
harbor energy-related resources that originated in the state from
leaving the state.29 6 These precedents could apply to geographically
restrictive RPS programs. A state also cannot require in-state coal to
be used by the state even for satisfying federal Clean Air Act
requirements,297 or give income tax credits only to in-state producers
of fuel additives. 298 These precedents could apply to geographically
restrictive SBC programs.
A limited constitutional exception occurs when a state participates
directly in the market as a purchaser, seller, or producer of articles of
commerce.299 However, in contrast to the exception for when a state
directly participates in the private power business, the constitutional
exception does not apply to state regulation of private power
companies.
For RPS programs and RECs, the states begin with a presumption
of authority to exercise jurisdiction rather than FERC. FERC held
that PURPA does not control the creation of state RECs associated
with the generation of power, even for wholesale transactions. 3 00
States can also assign to whom RECs belong: either to the seller or
the purchaser of wholesale power.30 1
States have professed an environmental justification for RPS, SBC
and other energy programs. 302 However, an environmental rationale
for discrimination based on the geographic origin of commerce does
295. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992); Alliance for Clean
Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
296. New Eng. Power Co. v.New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982).
297. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 595-97 (7th Cir. 1995).
298. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 277-78 (1988).
299. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); United
Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334,
346-47 (2007) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
300. Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC 61,004, 61,007 (2003).
301. Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep't. of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d
183, 186 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Ownership of Renewable Energy Certificates, 913
A.2d 825, 830-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); ARIPPA v. Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 966 A.2d 1204, 1210-11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
302. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983) (acknowledging respondents' argument that the
state safety regulation is not preempted when it conflicts with federal law, but
rejecting this argument).
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not resolve dormant Commerce Clause concerns. In West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, the Supreme Court found that "even if
environmental preservation were the central purpose of the
[regulation], that would not be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory
regulation." 303 In New Jersey, Colorado, Missouri, California, and
elsewhere, states are contesting dormant Commerce Clause violations
involving state energy or state electric power regulations. These cases
include the following:
* A challenge by conventional power generators of New
Jersey's in-state energy facility preferences.304
* A lawsuit on renewable power RPS RECs in Colorado.305
303. W. Lynn Creamery v. Healey, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1994) (citing
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)).
304. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 5603896 (D.N.J. Oct.
11, 2013); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 135 FERC 61,022 (2011). In 2011, New
Jersey enacted legislation to encourage the acquisition by utilities of the output of
2,000 Mw of new in-state power projects. Mary Powers, PJM Generators File
Complaint with FERC Seeking Relief from NJ In-State Generation Law, ELEC.

Feb. 7, 2011, at 11, 13. New Jersey faces a pending lawsuit by
independent power generators asserting that the state law violates the Commerce
Clause because it favors in-state producers, promotes the construction of new instate generation facilities, and requires utilities to sign long-term contracts only
with in-state generation facilities participating in multi-state PJM ISO capacity. See
PJM Interconnection, 135 FERC 61,022. In response, FERC amended the PJM
ISO rules to prevent New Jersey from encouraging construction of in-state power
generation by causing them to bid power into the PJM system at suppressed prices
in order to win capacity right auctions. Mary Powers, Rebuffed by FERC Ruling,
UTIL. WK.,

New Jersey BPU Plans to Look Again at How to Attract New Generation, ELEC.

May 23, 2011, at 4, 6.
305. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1-2, Am. Tradition Inst.
v. Colorado, 2011 WL 3705108 (D. Colo. Aug. 23, 2011) (No. 11-cv-00859-WJMKLM), available at http://americantradition.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/ATIRPS-Complaint-ATI-v-Colorado.pdf; Amended Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief, Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 2011 WL 3705108 (D. Colo.
Aug. 23, 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM). American Tradition Institute's
(ATI) Environmental Law Center filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the
constitutionality of Colorado's renewable energy standard based upon evidence
that the state's law violates the Commerce Clause. Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief at
1-2, Am. Tradition Inst., 2011 WL 3705108. ATI's
complaint argued that because the state mandate provides economic benefits to
Colorado's renewable electricity generators that are not available to out-of-state
UTIL. WK.,
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* A lawsuit on Missouri RPS RECs limited only to in-state
projects.3 06
* TransCanada's lawsuit against Massachusetts on
discriminating against out-of-state energy projects for
RPS RECs and renewable energy contracts.30 7
* California regulation of out-of-state energy products
based on the distance it must travel and the greater
carbon-intensity of electricity in the Midwest to produce
renewable energy fuel 308 (separate from California setting
in-state wholesale tariffs). 3 09
* Michigan being told that its RPS program was
unconstitutional for favoring in-state power for creation
of RPS RECs. 3 10

power generators, the program violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at
69, 70.
306. State. ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass'n. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Mo., No.
10AC-CC00512, slip op.
1, 4, 12 (Mo. Cnty. Ct. June 29, 2011). The state trial
court in 2011 ruled that the Missouri RPS program was illegal because it required
RECs to be generated by in-state projects or projects that delivered the power to instate customers. The opinion held that the RPS program "takes the cash property of
utilities (and their ratepayers) and transfers it to certain customers" without due
process. Id. The decision was reversed on appeal. State ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev.
Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 386 S.W.3d 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
307. Complaint, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070FDS (D. Mass. 2010).
308. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 108790 (E.D. Cal. 2011). The court reiterated that only the federal government can
regulate commerce between the states, and California's attempt to regulate
commerce outside its borders violates the exclusive federal authority to regulate
interstate commerce. See id. at 1092. California gave less value to the identical
energy fuel, ethanol, when produced in the Midwest, because of the latter region's
use of coal-fired power for electricity in the Midwest used to produce ethanol and
other products, and the longer transportation distance for trucks to transport ethanol
from there to California. See id. at 1088-89. While such discrimination did reflect
the total embedded energy emissions and transportation costs of different means to
produce the energy products and to move them to the market from geographically
distant production sources, the court held that states cannot elect to discriminate
against more-distant out-of-state products. Id. at 1089.
309. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 132 FERC 61,047 (2010).
310. Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).
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* Vermont's attempt to discriminate against the sale of
cheaper interstate power that could be sold outside of its
origin in Vermont. 311
In the final bulleted matter regarding the Shumlin case in Vermont,
the district court found that Vermont's regulation violated the
dormant Commerce Clause. 312 The Shumlin opinion313 followed the
Supreme Court decision in New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire.314 The Court in New England Power overturned, as a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, 315 the state Public
Utilities Commission's order that restrained renewable power
produced within the state for the financial advantage of in-state
ratepayers: 316
[We] consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution, [a]rt. I, § 8, cl. 3, precludes a state from
mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of
access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources
located within its borders or to the products derived
therefrom.... [A] "State is without power to prevent
privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and
sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are
required to satisfy local demands or because they are
needed by the people of the State."3 17
The federal trial court in 2012 reiterated that:
[S]tates are "without power to prevent privately owned
articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate
311. EntergyNuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (D.
Vt. 2012), aff'd in part,vacated in part,733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).

312. Id. at 239.
313. Id.
314. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
315. See id. at 344; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
316. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 331-32, 344
(1982).
317. Id. at 338 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)
(citations omitted)).
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commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy
local demands or because they are needed by the people of
the State,"

. . .

[a] "protectionist regulation" violating the

Commerce Clause.3 1 8
In April 2010, TransCanada sued Massachusetts for violating the
Commerce Clause where the state required utilities to negotiate longterm contracts with in-state energy providers, and created incentives
for in-state solar energy projects regardless of where the power
generation creating the RECs was sold. 3 19 TransCanada alleged that
the Massachusetts legislation is facially discriminatory against
renewable energy providers in limiting the origin of the power to instate renewable energy generators.320 Additionally, TransCanada
argued that Massachusetts ratepayers would be negatively impacted
because they would be limited to and forced to pay higher rates for
in-state renewable energy.321 Massachusetts immediately settled this
lawsuit rather than risk constitutional scrutiny in federal courts.322
318. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (quoting New Eng.

Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338-39). The Second Circuit added that a statute or
regulation would discriminate against commerce when the statute:
(i) [S]hifts the costs of regulation onto other states, permitting in-state
lawmakers to avoid the costs of their political decisions, (ii) has the
practical effect of requiring out-of-state commerce to be conducted at the
regulating state's direction, or (iii) alters the interstate flow of the goods in
question, as distinct from the impact on companies trading in those goods.
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 431 n.37 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
319. See Erin Ailworth, State Looking to Settle Suit Over Law on Clean Energy,

Bos. GLOBE, May 27, 2010, http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/05/27/
lawsuit hitsmasslawpromotinglocalenergyproviders.
320. Complaint
18-19, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10cv-40070-FDS (D. Mass. filed Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter TransCanada
Complaint] (requiring electric distribution companies to enter into long-term
contracts with in-state renewable energy generators).
321. Id. 26.
322. See Partial Settlement Agreement, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v.
Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS (D. Mass. filed Apr. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/settlement-agreement.pdf
(last visited Jan. 13, 2014); see also Erin Ailworth, State, TransCanadaReach
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The Supreme Court has consistently "held that the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution, [a]rt. I, § 8, cl. 3, precludes a state from
mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over
out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders
or to the products derived therefrom."3 23
The Seventh Circuit in 2013 rendered the most definitive
declaration on the constitutionality of RPS. Writing for a unanimous
court in Illinois Commerce Commission v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Judge Richard Posner affirmed FERC's
authority over regional transmission organizations (RTO) under the
FPA. 324 Posner declared that any state limiting state renewable
portfolio standards to in-state generation violated the Commerce
Clause. 325 The Seventh Circuit's mid-2013 ruling spurred immediate
legal repercussions, where within a few days petitions for rehearing
were filed in New York in light of Illinois Commerce Commission.326
In a still on-appeal lawsuit regarding New Jersey energy
regulation, independent power generators alleged that a New Jersey
law violated the Supremacy and Dormant Commerce Clauses
in Lawsuit, BOSTON.COM (May 28, 2010), http://
www.boston.com/business/ticker/2010/05/state-transcana.html.
Compare
Ailworth, supra note 319 (reporting in May 2010 that the parties reached
Partial Settlement

settlement), with Complaint, TransCanadaPower Mktg. Ltd., No. 4:10-cv-40070-

FDS (filing suit against Massachusetts in April 2010).
323. New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338.

324. Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 764, 781 (7th Cir. 2013).
325. Id. at 776 (citing Steven Ferrey, Threading the ConstitutionalNeedle with
Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable
Power, 7 TEXAS J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 69, 106-07 (2012) ("It trips over an

insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the
commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state
renewable energy.")); cf West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 208
(1994) (Scalia, J., Concurring) (concluding that "a state subsidy [for an in-state
industry] would clearly be invalid under any formulation of the Court's guiding
principle" under the negative Commerce Clause) (emphasis in original). Judge
Posner was responding sua sponte to Michigan's assertions on the tariff issue.
Although the tariff issue was not before the court, Michigan argued that it should
not have to pay tariffs associated with out-of-state power lines because Michigan's
RPS program discriminated against out-of-state electricity as not of the same value
as in-state electricity. See id. at 776.
326. See, e.g., Petition for Rehearing at 16-17, H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc.,
Case 03-E-0 188 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 21, 2013).
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because it is predicated on in-state "favoritism," and is a "blatant and
explicit effort to promote the construction of new generation facilities
in New Jersey." 327 In 2011, FERC responded to these allegations by
removing a state exemption in the PJM ISO rules to prevent New
Jersey from incentivizing construction of in-state power
generation.328
Regulating out-of-state conduct is not the only test for
discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause. In Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, a California district court

held that "tying carbon intensity scores to the distance a good travels
in interstate commerce discriminates against interstate commerce"
and violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 329 The district court
found that California's low carbon fuel standard "discriminates
against out-of-state corn-derived ethanol while favoring in-state corn
ethanol and impermissibly regulates extraterritorial conduct." 330 The
court's finding illustrates the Supreme Court's broader definition of
discrimination, which "simply means differential treatment of in-state
and out of state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter." 331
The district court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union also found

that defendants had not met their burden of showing that there was no
nondiscriminatory means to adequately serve their objective.332

327. Hanna Northey, Energy Markets: Utilities Challenge N.J Law While
Preparing to Reap Its Benefits, ENV'T & ENERGY PUBLISHING, Mar. 2, 2011,
http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/03/02/4.
328. Powers, supra note 304, at 4, 6 (reporting that FERC, on April 12, 2011,
eliminated a PJM rule that allowed a prior exemption for projects to make
minimum offer prices when tempered by state energy programs). FERC's
amendment would likely cause state utilities to bid power into the PJM system at
ninety percent of their cost, making it less sure that they will clear PJM's capacity
auctions. Id.
329. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088
(E.D. Cal. 2011).
330. Id. at 1105.
331. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)
(citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)) (noting that under the
Pike test, courts will uphold a non-facially discriminatory statute "unless 'the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits."').
332. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
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Indeed, the trial court noted that California had other means of
addressing its renewable energy concerns without discriminating
against out-of-state renewable fuel products.333 Incorporating the
Supreme Court's approach in Dean Milk in choosing means least
discriminatory to or intrusive on interstate commerce,334 the district
court in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was concerned about a

statute that either facially discriminated against interstate commerce
or impermissibly controlled conduct outside its borders.33 5 This
decision was reversed on appeal.3 36
As compared to projects involving RPS and carbon control,
projects involving SBC funds do not provide in-state job growth and
do not increase the in-state tax base. In the absence of congressional
action, the Commerce Clause does not prohibit states from
participating in the market and favoring its own citizens.337 Some
states impose dejure or defacto restrictions on SBC funds to in-state
projects. 338 Illinois, for example, restricts use of its SBC funding to
"developing new renewable energy resources and clean coal
333. See id. at 1094 ("Although these approaches may be less desirable, for a
number of reasons, Defendants have failed to establish there are no
nondiscriminatory means by which California could serve its purpose of combating
global warming through the reduction of GHG emissions."); see, e.g., Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951) (finding that the state cannot
discriminate against interstate commerce, "even in the exercise of its unquestioned
power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.").
334. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F.2d at 1094 (citing Dean Milk, 340
U.S 349); see also Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354.
335. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. Compare

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580
(1986) ("While a State may seek lower prices for its consumers, it may not insist
that producers or consumers in other States surrender whatever competitive
advantages they may possess."), with Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
521 (1935) holding that one state "has no power to project its legislation into
[another state] by regulating the price to be paid in that state for [products] acquired
there."), and Daghlian v. Devry Univ., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1243 (C.D. Cal.
2007) ("[L]egislation favoring in-state economic interests is facially invalid under
the dormant Commerce Clause, even when such legislation also burdens some instate interests or includes some out-of-state interests in the favored classification.").
336. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, et al., 730 F.3d 1070, 1104 (9th
Cir. 2013), petitionfor cert.filed (U.S. Mar. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1148).

337. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
338. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 687/6-2 (LexisNexis 2013).
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technologies for use in Illinois" 339 and specifies that "the criteria [for
distributing these funds] should [be to] promote the goal of fostering
investment in and the development and use, in Illinois, of renewable
energy resources." 34 0 However, the Illinois statute may be open to
challenge.
States are currently facing dormant Commerce Clause challenges
to both RPS and SBC projects. In a majority of these cases that have
been decided on the merits, states have lost at either the trial or
appellate levels. Outside the courthouse, constitutional concerns are
manifest among states, where approximately three-quarters of states
- 341
engage in in-state favoritism using state incentives,
with
each state
342
doing so on an individualized basis, thus foretelling that states
could face challenges. Given the long history of energy controversies
in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the recent
challenges to state renewable energy policies, states and their citizens
may pay a price for not enacting renewable energy policies more
carefully.
VII. WHY LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE RENEWABLE INCENTIVES MATTER
First, renewable energy is of key importance. Certain renewable
and distributed electric energy technologies are a critical component

of future U.S. electric infrastructure due to their inexhaustible nature
as well as their greater reliability and efficiency in certain combined

heat and power distributed generation.34 3 Renewable power is
virtually inexhaustible. "Energy used by humankind on the earth
equals only approximately 0.01% of the total solar energy reaching

33 9. Id.

340. Id. at 687/6-3(b) (1997) (emphasis added); see also id. at 687/6-4(b). In

establishing the existence of the Renewable Energy Resources Trust Fund, the fund
"shall be administered by the Department to provide grants, loans, and other
incentives to foster investment in and the development and use of renewable
resources as provided in Section 6-3 or pursuant to the Illinois Renewable Fuels
Development Program Act." Id. at 687/6-4(b).
341. See supra notes 102-27.

342. See supra notes 93-98.
343. See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin & Paul K. McCary, Peaceful Coexistence, PUB.
UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Mar. 2013, http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2013/03/
peaceful-coexistence (reporting the benefits of macrogrids).
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the earth." 344 Solar energy, less than an hour and a half, provides as
much potential energy as humankind uses each year.345 "In fact, no
nation on earth uses more energy than the energy content contained
in the sunlight that strikes its existing buildings every day."346 "The
solar energy that falls on roads in the United States each year
contains roughly as much energy content as all the fossil fuel
consumed in the world during that same year." 347 Wind power's
global energy potential is thirty-five times world electricity use. 348
Second, the utility system functions as a regulated public good.
Average Americans would likely support accelerated development of
renewable energy sources. The electric power system offers an
unusual ability to redistribute the costs of electricity as a public good
through regulatory order for the following reasons:
* In seventy percent of the states, there is a regulated
monopoly on supply of electric power 349 which offers the
customers no choice in what goes into that supply and
what it costs.
* In 100% of the states, there is a regulated monopoly over
transmission and distribution of electric power, giving the
customer little choice over how power is delivered and
what that costs.

344. STEVEN FERREY WITH ANIL CABRAAL, RENEWABLE POWER IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL WARMING 36 (2006) (stating that

Canada appealed the WTO ruling in 2013).
345. Jeff Tsao et al., Solar FAQs 10 (U.S. Dep't of Energy et al., Working Paper,
2006), http://www.sandia.gov/~jytsao/Solar%/o20FAQs.pdf
("This theoretical
potential represents more energy striking the earth's surface in one and a half hours
than worldwide energy consumption in the year 2001 from all sources combined.")
(parentheticals omitted).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Amory B. Lovins et al., Forget Nuclear, ROCKY MTN. INST. SOLUTIONS,

Spring
2008,
at
1,
25,
http://www.rmi.org/Content/Files/
SolutionsJournalSpring2008.pdf.
349. See State-by-State, supra note 16. Thirty-six states still maintain monopolies
on the sale of electric power.
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State regulators discriminate in the pricing of both the power
commodity and delivery charges to different customers. 3 50
Third, there is a way to "get there from here." States can-but do
not always-use their regulatory authority within constitutional
requirements to support sustainable energy. With parties currently
suing states and contesting the exercise of state authority, states
should focus carefully on the legal contours of permissible regulation
of sustainable energy initiatives. This article charts what does and
does not meet legal requirements, the inflection points of state and
federal authority, and what will avoid a constitutional challenge to
sustainable energy policies. An upcoming article being developed by
the author will introduce a legally resilient tool to the regulatory
arsenal.351 These tools will guide states in legally implementing
renewable energy policies, prevent plaintiffs from successfully
challenging these policies in Court, and avoid paying the large fees
associated with these challenges.

350. See FERREY, supra note 27,

351. Ferrey, supra note 24.

§ 10:17 (discussing rate discounts).

